# 1NC

### 1

#### A – interpretation:

#### Topical affirmatives must affirm the resolution through defense of action by the United States Federal Government.

#### B – definitions:

#### Should denotes an expectation of enacting a plan

American Heritage Dictionary 2000 (Dictionary.com)

should. The will to do something or have something take place: I shall go out if I feel like it.

#### Federal government is the central government in Washington DC

Encarta Online 2005,

http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia\_1741500781\_6/United\_States\_(Government).html#howtocite

United States (Government), **the combination of** federal, state, and local **laws, bodies, and agencies** that is **responsible for carrying out the operations of the United States. The federal government of the United States is centered** in [Washington, D.C.](http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_761576320/Washington_D_C.html)

#### Resolved implies a policy

Louisiana House 3-8-2005, <http://house.louisiana.gov/house-glossary.htm>

Resolution A legislative instrument that generally is used for making declarations, stating policies, and making decisions where some other form is not required. A bill includes the constitutionally required enacting clause; a resolution uses the term "resolved". Not subject to a time limit for introduction nor to governor's veto. ( Const. Art. III, §17(B) and House Rules 8.11 , 13.1 , 6.8 , and 7.4)

#### C – Vote neg –

#### First is Decisionmaking

#### The primary purpose of debate should be to improve our skills as decision-makers. We are all individual policy-makers who make choices every day that affect us and those around us. We have an obligation to the people affected by our decisions to use debate as a method for honing these critical thinking and information processing abilities.

Austin J. Freeley and David L. Steinberg – John Carroll University / U Miami – 2009, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making, p. 1-4, googlebooks

After several days of intense debate, first the United States House of Representatives and then the U.S. Senate voted to authorize President George W. Bush to attack Iraq if Saddam Hussein refused to give up weapons of mass destruction as required by United Nations's resolutions. Debate about a possible military\* action against Iraq continued in various governmental bodies and in the public for six months, until President Bush ordered an attack on Baghdad, beginning Operation Iraqi Freedom, the military campaign against the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein. He did so despite the unwillingness of the U.N. Security Council to support the military action, and in the face of significant international opposition.¶ Meanwhile, and perhaps equally difficult for the parties involved, a young couple deliberated over whether they should purchase a large home to accommodate their growing family or should sacrifice living space to reside in an area with better public schools; elsewhere a college sophomore reconsidered his major and a senior her choice of law school, graduate school, or a job. Each of these\* situations called for decisions to be made. Each decision maker worked hard to make well-reasoned decisions.¶ Decision making is a thoughtful process of choosing among a variety of options for acting or thinking. It requires that the decider make a choice. Life demands decision making. We make countless individual decisions every day. To make some of those decisions, we work hard to employ care and consideration; others seem to just happen. Couples, families, groups of friends, and coworkers come together to make choices, and decision-making bodies from committees to juries to the U.S. Congress and the United Nations make decisions that impact us all. Every profession requires effective and ethical decision making, as do our school, community, and social organizations.¶ We all make many decisions every day. To refinance or sell one's home, to buy a high-performance SUV or an economical hybrid car. what major to select, what to have for dinner, what candidate to vote for, paper or plastic, all present us with choices. Should the president deal with an international crisis through military invasion or diplomacy? How should the U.S. Congress act to address illegal immigration?¶ Is the defendant guilty as accused? The Daily Show or the ball game? And upon what information should I rely to make my decision? Certainly some of these decisions are more consequential than others. Which amendment to vote for, what television program to watch, what course to take, which phone plan to purchase, and which diet to pursue all present unique challenges. At our best, we seek out research and data to inform our decisions. Yet even the choice of which information to attend to requires decision making. In 2006, TIME magazine named YOU its "Person of the Year." Congratulations! Its selection was based on the participation not of ''great men" in the creation of history, but rather on the contributions of a community of anonymous participants in the evolution of information. Through blogs. online networking. You Tube. Facebook, MySpace, Wikipedia, and many other "wikis," knowledge and "truth" are created from the bottom up, bypassing the authoritarian control of newspeople, academics, and publishers. We have access to infinite quantities of information, but how do we sort through it and select the best information for our needs?¶ The ability of every decision maker to make good, reasoned, and ethical decisions relies heavily upon their ability to think critically. Critical thinking enables one to break argumentation down to its component parts in order to evaluate its relative validity and strength. Critical thinkers are better users of information, as well as better advocates.¶ Colleges and universities expect their students to develop their critical thinking skills and may require students to take designated courses to that end. The importance and value of such study is widely recognized.¶ Much of the most significant communication of our lives is conducted in the form of debates. These may take place in intrapersonal communications, in which we weigh the pros and cons of an important decision in our own minds, or they may take place in interpersonal communications, in which we listen to arguments intended to influence our decision or participate in exchanges to influence the decisions of others.¶ Our success or failure in life is largely determined by our ability to make wise decisions for ourselves and to influence the decisions of others in ways that are beneficial to us. Much of our significant, purposeful activity is concerned with making decisions. Whether to join a campus organization, go to graduate school, accept a job oiler, buy a car or house, move to another city, invest in a certain stock, or vote for Garcia—these are just a few of the thousands of decisions we may have to make. Often, intelligent self-interest or a sense of responsibility will require us to win the support of others. We may want a scholarship or a particular job for ourselves, a customer for out product, or a vote for our favored political candidate.

#### Specifically, through discussing paths of government action, debate teaches us to be better organizational decision makers. Learning about the uniquely different considerations of organizations is necessary to affecting change in a world overwhelmingly dominated by institutions.

Algoso 2011 – Masters in Public Administration (May 31, Dave, “Why I got an MPA: Because organizations matter” <http://findwhatworks.wordpress.com/2011/05/31/why-i-got-an-mpa-because-organizations-matter/>)

Because organizations matter. Forget the stories of heroic individuals written in your middle school civics textbook. Nothing of great importance is ever accomplished by a single person. Thomas Edison had lab assistants, George Washington’s army had thousands of troops, and Mother Teresa’s Missionaries of Charity had over a million staff and volunteers when she passed away. Even Jesus had a 12-man posse. In different ways and in vastly different contexts, these were all organizations. Pick your favorite historical figure or contemporary hero, and I can almost guarantee that their greatest successes occurred as part of an organization. Even the most charismatic, visionary and inspiring leaders have to be able to manage people, or find someone who can do it for them. International development work is no different. Regardless of your issue of interest — whether private sector investment, rural development, basic health care, government capacity, girls’ education, or democracy promotion — your work will almost always involve operating within an organization. How well or poorly that organization functions will have dramatic implications for the results of your work. A well-run organization makes better decisions about staffing and operations; learns more from its mistakes; generates resources and commitment from external stakeholders; and structures itself to better promote its goals. None of this is easy or straightforward. We screw it up fairly often. Complaints about NGO management and government bureaucracy are not new. We all recognize the need for improvement. In my mind, the greatest challenges and constraints facing international development are managerial and organizational, rather than technical. Put another way: the greatest opportunities and leverage points lie in how we run our organizations. Yet our discourse about the international development industry focuses largely on how much money donors should commit to development and what technical solutions (e.g. deworming, elections, roads, whatever) deserve the funds. We give short shrift to the questions around how organizations can actually turn those funds into the technical solutions. The closest we come is to discuss the incentives facing organizations due to donor or political requirements. I think we can go deeper in addressing the management and organizational issues mentioned above. This thinking led me to an MPA degree because it straddles that space between organizations and issues. A degree in economics or international affairs could teach you all about the problems in the world, and you may even learn how to address them. But if you don’t learn how to operate in an organization, you may not be able to channel the resources needed to implement solutions. On the flip side, a typical degree in management offers relevant skills, but without the content knowledge necessary to understand the context and the issues. I think the MPA, if you choose the right program for you and use your time well, can do both.

#### Additionally, the best route to improving decision-making is through discussion about public policy

#### Mutually accessible info – there is a wide swath of literature on governmental policy topics – that ensures there will be informed, predictable, and in-depth debate over the aff’s decision. Individual policymaking is highly variable depending on the person and inaccessible to outsiders.

#### Harder decisions make better decisionmakers – the problems facing public policymakers are a magnitude greater than private decisions.

#### External actors – the decisions we make should be analyzed not in a vacuum but in the complex social field that surrounds us

#### A focus on policy is necessary to learn the pragmatic details of powerful institutions – acting without this knowledge is doomed to fail in the face of policy pros who know what they’re talking about [highlight]

McClean 01 SOCIETY FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY – GRADUATE AND PHILOSOPHER – NYU, “THE CULTURAL LEFT AND THE LIMITS OF SOCIAL HOPE”, http://www.american-philosophy.org/archives/2001%20Conference/Discussion%20papers/david\_mcclean.htm]

Leftist American culture critics might put their considerable talents to better use if they bury some of their cynicism about America's social and political prospects and help forge public and political possibilities in a spirit of determination to, indeed, achieve our country - the country of Jefferson and King; the country of John Dewey and Malcom X; the country of Franklin Roosevelt and Bayard Rustin, and of the later George Wallace and the later Barry Goldwater. To invoke the words of King, and with reference to the American society, the time is always ripe to seize the opportunity to help create the "beloved community," one woven with the thread of agape into a conceptually single yet diverse tapestry that shoots for nothing less than a true intra-American cosmopolitan ethos, one wherein both same sex unions and faith-based initiatives will be able to be part of the same social reality, one wherein business interests and the university are not seen as belonging to two separate galaxies but as part of the same answer to the threat of social and ethical nihilism. We who fancy ourselves philosophers would do well to create from within ourselves and from within our ranks a new kind of public intellectual who has both a hungry theoretical mind and who is yet capable of seeing the need to move past high theory to other important questions that are less bedazzling and "interesting" but more important to the prospect of our flourishing - questions such as "How is it possible to develop a citizenry that cherishes a certain hexis, one which prizes the character of the Samaritan on the road to Jericho almost more than any other?" or "How can we square the political dogma that undergirds the fantasy of a missile defense system with the need to treat America as but one member in a community of nations under a "law of peoples?"The new public philosopher might seek to understand labor law and military and trade theory and doctrine as much as theories of surplus value; the logic of international markets and trade agreements as much as critiques of commodification, and the politics of complexity as much as the politics of power (all of which can still be done from our arm chairs.) This means going down deep into the guts of our quotidian social institutions, into the grimy pragmatic details where intellectuals are loathe to dwell but where the officers and bureaucrats of those institutions take difficult and often unpleasant, imperfect decisions that affect other peoples' lives, and it means making honest attempts to truly understand how those institutions actually function in the actual world before howling for their overthrow commences. This might help keep us from being slapped down in debates by true policy pros who actually know what they are talking about but who lack awareness of the dogmatic assumptions from which they proceed, and who have not yet found a good reason to listen to jargon-riddled lectures from philosophers and culture critics with their snobish disrespect for the so-called "managerial class."

#### Forcing specific policy analysis is key – allows state institutions to be reclaimed and generates debater education necessary to create a left governmentality – necessary to create a public sphere [highlight]

Ferguson, Professor of Anthropology at Stanford, 11

(The Uses of Neoliberalism, Antipode, Vol. 41, No. S1, pp 166–184)

If we are seeking, as this special issue of Antipode aspires to do, to link our critical analyses to the world of grounded political struggle—not only to interpret the world in various ways, but also to change it—then there is much to be said for focusing, as I have here, on mundane, real- world debates around policy and politics, even if doing so inevitably puts us on the compromised and reformist terrain of the possible, rather than the seductive high ground of revolutionary ideals and utopian desires. But I would also insist that there is more at stake in the examples I have discussed here than simply a slightly better way to ameliorate the miseries of the chronically poor, or a technically superior method for relieving the suffering of famine victims.¶ My point in discussing the South African BIG campaign, for instance, is not really to argue for its implementation. There is much in the campaign that is appealing, to be sure. But one can just as easily identify a series of worries that would bring the whole proposal into doubt. Does not, for instance, the decoupling of the question of assistance from the issue of labor, and the associated valorization of the “informal”, help provide a kind of alibi for the failures of the South African regime to pursue policies that would do more to create jobs? Would not the creation of a basic income benefit tied to national citizenship simply exacerbate the vicious xenophobia that already divides the South African poor,¶ in a context where many of the poorest are not citizens, and would thus not be eligible for the BIG? Perhaps even more fundamentally, is the idea of basic income really capable of commanding the mass support that alone could make it a central pillar of a new approach to distribution? The record to date gives powerful reasons to doubt it. So far, the technocrats’ dreams of relieving poverty through efficient cash transfers have attracted little support from actual poor people, who seem to find that vision a bit pale and washed out, compared with the vivid (if vague) populist promises of jobs and personalistic social inclusion long offered by the ANC patronage machine, and lately personified by Jacob Zuma (Ferguson forthcoming).¶ My real interest in the policy proposals discussed here, in fact, has little to do with the narrow policy questions to which they seek to provide answers. For what is most significant, for my purposes, is not whether or not these are good policies, but the way that they illustrate a process through which specific governmental devices and modes of reasoning that we have become used to associating with a very particular (and conservative) political agenda (“neoliberalism”) may be in the process of being peeled away from that agenda, and put to very different uses. Any progressive who takes seriously the challenge I pointed to at the start of this essay, the challenge of developing new progressive arts of government, ought to find this turn of events of considerable interest.¶ As Steven Collier (2005) has recently pointed out, it is important to question the assumption that there is, or must be, a neat or automatic fit between a hegemonic “neoliberal” political-economic project (however that might be characterized), on the one hand, and specific “neoliberal” techniques, on the other. Close attention to particular techniques (such as the use of quantitative calculation, free choice, and price driven by supply and demand) in particular settings (in Collier’s case, fiscal and budgetary reform in post-Soviet Russia) shows that the relationship between the technical and the political-economic “is much more polymorphous and unstable than is assumed in much critical geographical work”, and that neoliberal technical mechanisms are in fact “deployed in relation to diverse political projects and social norms” (2005:2).¶ As I suggested in referencing the role of statistics and techniques for pooling risk in the creation of social democratic welfare states, social technologies need not have any essential or eternal loyalty to the political formations within which they were first developed. Insurance rationality at the end of the nineteenth century had no essential vocation to provide security and solidarity to the working class; it was turned to that purpose (in some substantial measure) because it was available, in the right place at the right time, to be appropriated for that use. Specific ways of solving or posing governmental problems, specific institutional and intellectual mechanisms, can be combined in an almost infinite variety of ways, to accomplish different social ends. With social, as with any other sort of technology, it is not the machines or the mechanisms that decide what they will be used to do.¶ Foucault (2008:94) concluded his discussion of socialist government- ality by insisting that the answers to the Left’s governmental problems require not yet another search through our sacred texts, but a process of conceptual and institutional innovation. “[I]f there is a really socialist governmentality, then it is not hidden within socialism and its texts. It cannot be deduced from them. It must be invented”. But invention in the domain of governmental technique is rarely something worked up out of whole cloth. More often, it involves a kind of bricolage (Le ́vi- Strauss 1966), a piecing together of something new out of scavenged parts originally intended for some other purpose. As we pursue such a process of improvisatory invention, we might begin by making an inventory of the parts available for such tinkering, keeping all the while an open mind about how different mechanisms might be put to work, and what kinds of purposes they might serve. If we can go beyond seeing in “neoliberalism” an evil essence or an automatic unity, and instead learn to see a field of specific governmental techniques, we may be surprised to find that some of them can be repurposed, and put to work in the service of political projects very different from those usually associated with that word. If so, we may find that the cabinet of governmental arts available to us is a bit less bare than first appeared, and that some rather useful little mechanisms may be nearer to hand than we thought.

#### Second is Predictable Limits - The resolution proposes the question the negative is prepared to answer and creates a bounded list of potential affs for us to think about. Debate has unique potential to change attitudes and grow critical thinking skills because it forces pre-round internal deliberation on a of a focused, common ground of debate

Robert E. **Goodin and** Simon J. **Niemeyer**- Australian National University- **2003**,

When Does Deliberation Begin? Internal Reflection versus Public Discussion in Deliberative Democracy, POLITICAL STUDIES: 2003 VOL 51, 627–649, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.0032-3217.2003.00450.x/pdf

What happened in this particular case, as in any particular case, was in some respects peculiar unto itself. The problem of the Bloomfield Track had been well known and much discussed in the local community for a long **time. Exaggerated claims and counter-claims had become entrenched, and unreflective public opinion polarized around them**. In this circumstance, **the effect of the information phase of deliberative processes was to brush away those highly polarized attitudes, dispel the myths and symbolic posturing on both sides that had come to dominate the debate, and liberate people to act upon their attitudes** toward the protection of rainforest itself. **The key** point, from the perspective of ‘democratic deliberation within’, **is that that happened in the earlier stages of deliberation – before the formal discussions** (‘deliberations’, in the discursive sense) of the jury process ever began. The simple process of jurors seeing the site for themselves, focusing their minds on the issues and listening to what experts had to say did virtually all the work in changing jurors’ attitudes. Talking among themselves, as a jury, did very little of it. However, the same might happen in cases very different from this one. Suppose that instead of highly polarized symbolic attitudes, what we have at the outset is mass ignorance or mass apathy or non-attitudes. There again, people’s engaging with the issue – focusing on it, acquiring information about it, thinking hard about it – would be something that is likely to occur earlier rather than later in the deliberative process. And more to our point, it is something that is most likely to occur within individuals themselves or in informal interactions, well in advance of any formal, organized group discussion. There is much in the large literature on attitudes and the mechanisms by which they change to support that speculation.31 Consider, for example, the literature on ‘central’ versus ‘peripheral’ routes to the formation of attitudes. Before deliberation, individuals may not have given the issue much thought or bothered to engage in an extensive process of reflection.32 In such cases, positions may be arrived at via peripheral routes, taking cognitive shortcuts or arriving at ‘top of the head’ conclusions or even simply following the lead of others believed to hold similar attitudes or values (Lupia, 1994). These shorthand approaches involve the use of available cues such as ‘expertness’ or ‘attractiveness’ (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986) – not deliberation in the internal-reflective sense we have described. Where peripheral shortcuts are employed, there may be inconsistencies in logic and the formation of positions, based on partial information or incomplete information processing. In contrast, ‘central’ routes to the development of attitudes involve the application of more deliberate effort to the matter at hand, in a way that is more akin to the internal-reflective deliberative ideal. Importantly for our thesis, there is nothing intrinsic to the ‘central’ route that requires group deliberation. Research in this area stresses instead the importance simply of ‘sufficient impetus’ for engaging in deliberation, such as when an individual is stimulated by personal involvement in the issue.33 The same is true of ‘on-line’ versus ‘memory-based’ processes of attitude change.34 The suggestion here is that **we lead our ordinary lives largely on autopilot, doing routine things in routine ways without much thought or reflection. When we come across something ‘new’, we update our routines – our ‘running’ beliefs and pro cedures, attitudes and evaluations – accordingly. But having updated, we then drop the impetus for the update into deep-stored ‘memory’**. A consequence of this procedure is that, **when asked in the ordinary course of events ‘what we believe’** or‘what attitude we take’ toward something, **we easily retrieve what we think but we cannot so easily retrieve the reasons why**. **That more fully reasoned assessment – the sort of thing we have been calling internal-reflective deliberation – requires us to call up reasons from stored memory rather than just consulting our running on-line ‘summary judgments’.** Crucially for our present discussion, once again, what prompts that shift from online to more deeply reflective deliberation is not necessarily interpersonal discussion. The impetus for fixing one’s attention on a topic, and retrieving reasons from stored memory, might come from any of a number sources: group discussion is only one. And again, even in the context of a group discussion, this shift from ‘online’ to ‘memory-based’ processing is likely to occur earlier rather than later in the process, often before the formal discussion ever begins. All this is simply to say that, on a great many models and in a great many different sorts of settings, it seems likely that **elements of the pre-discursive process are likely to prove crucial to the shaping and reshaping of people’s attitudes** in a citizens’ jury-style process. **The initial processes of focusing attention on a topic, providing information about it and inviting people to think hard about it is likely to provide a strong impetus to internal-reflective deliberation, altering not just the information people have about the issue but also the way people process that information and hence (perhaps) what they think about the issue.** What happens once people have shifted into this more internal-reflective mode is, obviously, an open question. Maybe people would then come to an easy consensus, as they did in their attitudes toward the Daintree rainforest.35 Or maybe people would come to divergent conclusions; and they then may (or may not) be open to argument and counter-argument, with talk actually changing minds. Our claim is not that group discussion will always matter as little as it did in our citizens’ jury.36 Our claim is instead merely that the earliest steps in the jury process – the sheer focusing of attention on the issue at hand and acquiring more information about it, and the internal-reflective deliberation that that prompts – will invariably matter more than deliberative democrats of a more discursive stripe would have us believe. However much or little difference formal group discussions might make, on any given occasion, the pre-discursive phases of the jury process will invariably have a considerable impact on changing the way jurors approach an issue. From Citizens’ Juries to Ordinary Mass Politics? In a citizens’ jury sort of setting, then, it seems that informal, pre-group deliberation – ‘deliberation within’ – will inevitably do much of the work that deliberative democrats ordinarily want to attribute to the more formal discursive processes. What are the preconditions for that happening? To what extent, in that sense, can findings about citizens’ juries be extended to other larger or less well-ordered deliberative settings? Even in citizens’ juries, deliberation will work only if people are attentive, open and willing to change their minds as appropriate. So, too, in mass politics. In citizens’ juries the need to participate (or **the anticipation of participating) in formally organized group discussions might be the ‘prompt’ that evokes those attributes**. But there might be many other possible ‘prompts’ that can be found in less formally structured mass-political settings. Here are a few ways citizens’ juries (and all cognate micro-deliberative processes)37 might be different from mass politics, and in which lessons drawn from that experience might not therefore carry over to ordinary politics: • A citizens’ jury concentrates people’s minds on a single issue. Ordinary politics involve many issues at once. • A citizens’ jury is often supplied a background briefing that has been agreed by all stakeholders (Smith and Wales, 2000, p. 58). In ordinary mass politics, there is rarely any equivalent common ground on which debates are conducted. • A citizens’ jury separates the process of acquiring information from that of discussing the issues. In ordinary mass politics, those processes are invariably intertwined. • A citizens’ jury is provided with a set of experts. They can be questioned, debated or discounted. But there is a strictly limited set of ‘competing experts’ on the same subject. In ordinary mass politics, claims and sources of expertise often seem virtually limitless, allowing for much greater ‘selective perception’. • Participating in something called a ‘citizens’ jury’ evokes certain very particular norms: norms concerning the ‘impartiality’ appropriate to jurors; norms concerning the ‘common good’ orientation appropriate to people in their capacity as citizens.38 There is a very different ethos at work in ordinary mass politics, which are typically driven by flagrantly partisan appeals to sectional interest (or utter disinterest and voter apathy). • In a citizens’ jury, **we think and listen in anticipation of the discussion phase, knowing that we soon will have to defend our views in a discursive setting where they will be probed intensively**.39 In ordinary mass-political settings, there is no such incentive for paying attention. It is perfectly true that citizens’ juries are ‘special’ in all those ways. But if being special in all those ways makes for a better – more ‘reflective’, more ‘deliberative’ – political process, then those are design features that we ought try to mimic as best we can in ordinary mass politics as well. There are various ways that that might be done. Briefing books might be prepared by sponsors of American presidential debates (the League of Women Voters, and such like) in consultation with the stakeholders involved. Agreed panels of experts might be questioned on prime-time television. Issues might be sequenced for debate and resolution, to avoid too much competition for people’s time and attention. Variations on the Ackerman and Fishkin (2002) proposal for a ‘deliberation day’ before every election might be generalized, with a day every few months being given over to small meetings in local schools to discuss public issues. All that is pretty visionary, perhaps. And (although it is clearly beyond the scope of the present paper to explore them in depth) there are doubtless many other more-or-less visionary ways of introducing into real-world politics analogues of the elements that induce citizens’ jurors to practice ‘democratic deliberation within’, even before the jury discussion gets underway. Here, we have to content ourselves with identifying those features that need to be replicated in real-world politics in order to achieve that goal – and with the ‘possibility theorem’ that is established by the fact that (as sketched immediately above) there is at least one possible way of doing that for each of those key features.

#### Third is Dogmatism – Most problems are not black and white but have complex, uncertain interactions. By declaring that targeted killing is always bad, they prevent us from understanding the nuances of an incredibly important and complex issue. This is the epitome of dogmatism

Keller, et. al,– Asst. professor School of Social Service Administration U. of Chicago - 2001

(Thomas E., James K., and Tracly K., Asst. professor School of Social Service Administration U. of Chicago, professor of Social Work, and doctoral student School of Social Work, “Student debates in policy courses: promoting policy practice skills and knowledge through active learning,” Journal of Social Work Education, Spr/Summer 2001, EBSCOhost)

John Dewey, the philosopher and educational reformer, suggested that the initial advance in the development of reflective thought occurs in the transition from holding fixed, static ideas to an attitude of doubt and questioning engendered by exposure to alternative views in social discourse (Baker, 1955, pp. 36-40). Doubt, confusion, and conflict resulting from discussion of diverse perspectives "force comparison, selection, and reformulation of ideas and meanings" (Baker, 1955, p. 45). Subsequent educational theorists have contended that learning requires openness to divergent ideas in combination with the ability to synthesize disparate views into a purposeful resolution (Kolb, 1984; Perry, 1970). On the one hand, clinging to the certainty of one's beliefs risks dogmatism, rigidity, and the inability to learn from new experiences. On the other hand, if one's opinion is altered by every new experience, the result is insecurity, paralysis, and the inability to take effective action. The educator's role is to help students develop the capacity to incorporate new and sometimes conflicting ideas and experiences into a coherent cognitive framework. Kolb suggests that, "if the education process begins by bringing out the learner's beliefs and theories, examining and testing them, and then integrating the new, more refined ideas in the person's belief systems, the learning process will be facilitated" (p. 28).

The authors believe that involving students in substantive debates challenges them to learn and grow in the fashion described by Dewey and Kolb. Participation in a debate stimulates clarification and critical evaluation of the evidence, logic, and values underlying one's own policy position. In addition, to debate effectively students must understand and accurately evaluate the opposing perspective. The ensuing tension between two distinct but legitimate views is designed to yield a reevaluation and reconstruction of knowledge and beliefs pertaining to the issue.

#### Our method solves – Even if the resolution is wrong, having a devil’s advocate in deliberation is vitally important to critical thinking skills and avoiding groupthink

**Hugo Mercier and Hélène Landemore- 2011**

**(Philosophy, Politics and Economics prof @ U of Penn, Poli Sci prof @ Yale), Reasoning is for arguing: Understanding the successes and failures of deliberation, Political Psychology, http://sites.google.com/site/hugomercier/publications**

Reasoning can function outside of its normal conditions when it is used purely internally. But it is not enough for reasoning to be done in public to achieve good results. And indeed the problems of individual reasoning highlighted above, such **as polarization and overconfidence, can** also **be found in group reasoning** (Janis, 1982; Stasser & Titus, 1985; Sunstein, 2002). Polarization and overconfidence happen **because not all group discussion is deliberative.** According to some definitions of deliberation, including the one used in this paper, **reasoning has to be applied to the same thread of argument *from different opinions* for deliberation to occur.** As a consequence, “**If the participants are mostly like-minded or hold the same views before they enter into the discussion, they are not situated in the circumstances of deliberation.”** (Thompson, 2008: 502). We will presently review evidence showing that the absence or the silencing of dissent is a quasi-necessary condition for polarization or overconfidence to occur in groups. Group polarization has received substantial empirical support. 11 So much support in fact that Sunstein has granted group polarization the status of law (Sunstein, 2002). There is however an important caveat: group polarization will mostly happen when people share an opinion to begin with. In defense of his claim, Sunstein reviews an impressive number of empirical studies showing that many groups tend to form more extreme opinions following discussion. The examples he uses, however, offer as convincing an illustration of group polarization than of the necessity of having group members that share similar beliefs at the outset for polarization to happen (e.g. Sunstein, 2002: 178). Likewise, in his review of the group polarization literature, Baron notes that “The crucial antecedent condition for group polarization to occur is the presence of a likeminded group; i.e. individuals who share a preference for one side of the issue.” (Baron, 2005). Accordingly, when groups do not share an opinion, they tend to depolarize. This has been shown in several experiments in the laboratory (e.g. Kogan & Wallach, 1966; Vinokur & Burnstein, 1978). Likewise, studies of deliberation about political or legal issues report that many groups do not polarize (Kaplan & Miller, 1987; Luskin, Fishkin, & Hahn, 2007; Luskin et al., 2002; Luskin, Iyengar, & Fishkin, 2004; Mendelberg & Karpowitz, 2000). On the contrary, some groups show a homogenization of their attitude (they depolarize) (Luskin et al., 2007; Luskin et al., 2002). The contrasting effect of discussions with a supportive versus dissenting audience is transparent in the results reported by Hansen ( 2003 reported by Fishkin & Luskin, 2005). Participants had been exposed to new information about a political issue. When they discussed it with their family and friends, they learned more facts supporting their initial position. On the other hand, during the deliberative weekend—and the exposition to other opinions that took place—they learned more of the facts supporting the view they disagreed with. The present theory, far from being contradicted by the observation that groups of likeminded people reasoning together tend to polarize, can in fact account straightforwardly for this observation. **When people are engaged in a genuine deliberation, the confirmation bias present in each individual’s reasoning is checked, compensated by the confirmation bias of individuals who defend another opinion. When no other opinion is present (or expressed, or listened to), people will be disinclined to use reasoning to critically examine the arguments put forward by other discussants**, since they share their opinion. **Instead, they will use reasoning to strengthen these arguments or find other arguments supporting the same opinion.** In most cases the reasons each individual has for holding the same opinion will be partially non-overlapping. Each participant will then be exposed to new reasons supporting the common opinion, reasons that she is unlikely to criticize. It is then only to be expected that group members should strengthen their support for the common opinion in light of these new arguments. In fact, **groups of like-minded people should have little endogenous motivation to start reasoning together: what is the point of arguing with people we agree with? In most cases, such groups are lead to argue because of some external constraint**. These constraints can be more or less artificial—a psychologist telling participants to deliberate or a judge asking a jury for a well supported verdict—but they have to be factored in the explanation of the phenomenon. 4. Conclusion: a situational approach to improving reasoning We have argued that reasoning should not be evaluated primarily, if at all, as a device that helps us generate knowledge and make better decisions through private reflection. Reasoning, in fact, does not do those things very well. Instead, we rely on the hypothesis that the function of reasoning is to find and evaluate arguments in deliberative contexts. This evolutionary hypothesis explains why, when reasoning is used in its normal conditions—in a deliberation—it can be expected to lead to better outcomes, consistently allowing deliberating groups to reach epistemically superior outcomes and improve their epistemic status. Moreover, seeing reasoning as an argumentative device also provides a straightforward account of the otherwise puzzling confirmation bias—the tendency to search for arguments that favor our opinion. The confirmation bias, in turn, generates most of the problems people face when they reason in abnormal conditions— when they are not deliberating. This will happen to people who reason alone while failing to entertain other opinions in a private deliberation and to groups in which one opinion is so dominant as to make all others opinions—if they are even present—unable to voice arguments. In both cases, the confirmation bias will go unchecked and create polarization and overconfidence. We believe that the argumentative theory offers a good explanation of the most salient facts about private and public reasoning. This explanation is meant to supplement, rather than replace, existing psychological theories by providing both an answer to the why-questions and a coherent integrative framework for many previously disparate findings. The present article was mostly aimed at comparing deliberative vs. non-deliberative situations, but the theory could also be used to make finer grained predictions within deliberative situations. It is important to stress that the theory used as the backbone for the article is a theory of reasoning. The theory can only make predictions about reasoning, and not about the various other psychological mechanisms that impact the outcome of group discussion. We did not aim at providing a general theory of group processes that could account for all the results in this domain. But it is our contention that the best way to reach this end is by investigating the relevant psychological mechanisms and their interaction. For these reasons, the present article should only be considered a first step towards more fined grained predictions of when and why deliberation is efficient. Turning now to the consequences of the present theory, we can note first that our emphasis on the efficiency of diverse groups sits well with another recent a priori account of group competence. According to Hong and Page’s Diversity Trumps Ability Theorem for example, under certain plausible conditions, a diverse sample of moderately competent individuals will outperform a group of the most competent individuals (Hong & Page, 2004). Specifically, what explains the superiority of some groups of average people over smaller groups of experts is the fact that cognitive diversity (roughly, the ability to interpret the world differently) can be more crucial to group competence than individual ability (Page, 2007). That argument has been carried over from groups of problem-solvers in business and practical matters to democratically deliberating groups in politics (e.g., Anderson, 2006; Author, 2007, In press). At the practical level, the present theory potentially has important implications. Given that individual reasoning works best when confronted to different opinions, the present theory supports the improvement of the presence or expression of dissenting opinions in deliberative settings. Evidently, many people, in the field of deliberative democracy or elsewhere, are also advocating such changes. While these common sense suggestions have been made in the past (e.g., Bohman,

2007; Sunstein, 2003, 2006), the present theory provides additional arguments for them. It also explains why approaches focusing on individual rather than collective reasoning are not likely to be successful. Specifically tailored practical suggestions can also be made by using departures from the normal conditions of reasoning as diagnostic tools. Thus, different departures will entail different solutions. Accountability—having to defends one’s opinion in front of an audience—can be used to bring individual reasoners closer to a situation of private deliberation. The use of different aggregation mechanisms could help identify the risk of deliberation among like-minded people. For example, before a group launches a discussion, a preliminary vote or poll could establish the extent to which different opinions are represented. If this procedure shows that people agree on the issue at hand, then skipping the discussion may save the group some efforts and reduce the risk of polarization. Alternatively, a **devil’s advocate** could be introduced in the group to defend an alternative opinion (e.g. Schweiger, Sandberg, & Ragan, 1986).

### 2

#### We advocate the entirety of the affirmative without their use of the term “ableism” – Instead, understanding oppression experienced surrounding disability should conceptualize it as “disablism” – breaks the connection between discrimination and ability

Chapman 10, Professor of Social Work at York University

(Christopher S., Crippling narratives and disabling shame: disability as a metaphor, affective dividing practices, and an ethics that might make a difference, still.my.revolution.tao.ca/node/68)

I used to use the term "ableism" to describe oppression against people who are labeled as disabled and/or the idea that disabled people are not as good as to non-disabled people. Within the past year or so, however, I have begun using the word "disablism" instead. There are a lot of reasons for this, but the primary one is the fact that ableism implies that this oppression is somehow related to ability – which it is not. Disability is a social category and its label is imposed on certain groups of people because of their perceived characteristics as un(der)productive. Internationally, disablism is the more commonly used term and, it is my understanding, ableism is really used only in North America and Australlia. The reason for this, I believe, is the way the disability rights movement emerged in each country. In the U.K., the emphasis was on the construction of disability and how people were disabled by social barriers. In the U.S. the focus was rights. There are, however, some folks in the United States who do use disablism exclusively or who use them both. When I began writing and speaking about disability, I used the term ableism; that is what I had been exposed to living in Canada. I didn't question the term and when, years later, I began to learn about the (British) social model I just thought it was one of those word differences that we have across the pond, like tampon and fanny pack or cigarette and fag. I only began to appreciate the intentional usage of “disablism” in the past few years. Then, one day, a non-disabled friend of mine was chatting about how someone at her work was being (dis/)ableist. But, she didn't say that, what she said was "what about ability?" That was when I realized that using ableism makes it really easy for people to equate ablesim with discrimination based on ability. This is a very problematic association. That is why I started using disablism rather than ableism to describe disabled people's oppression. Lisa, author of Lizy Babe's Blog, writes: "If 'racism' is discrimination on the grounds of race, surely it is logical that the word for discrimination on the grounds of disability would be 'disablism'?" She goes on to argue that "'ableism' is derived from the medical model of disability - the idea that a disability is something we have, that we are disabled by a lack of ability." I also think it is easier for those who use the term ableism to talk about able-bodied people, but this too is very problematic. The opposite of disabled is not able-bodied for a number of reasons. Firstly, "able-bodied" describes a physical state. Many people can be disabled and able-bodied at the same time as there are a number of different aspects of disability, not solely physical disability. What then, within this linguistic logic would you call people who are not psychiatized and don't have intellectual disabilities? Able-brained? Able-minded? I am offended by my invention of these words and can't imagine them being used. Also in the realm of the physical is the fact that able-bodied is adopted from a medical model, as I have already said, disability is not about "the body" of an individual, it is about the social categorization of certain kinds of people. Lastly, the idea that there are people who are able-bodied and not able-bodied is very troubling. Everyone has an "able body." Our bodies are what keep us alive, what sustain us – disabled or not. Words like "paralysis" and "disabled" are often used in disablist ways to talk about full stops but this is far from the way disabled people live our lives. If someone becomes disabled, their life continues and their body, while different (and possibly even painful or frustrating) is what allows their life to continue. Chris Chapman writes: In fact, we could imagine a less ableist account of literal paralysis – perhaps – as being more in line with what Kris describes: if I was to literally lose mobility in my legs today, my life won’t stop, but I’ll be fundamentally changed in enormous ways that I could never anticipate beforehand. It’s only ableism (sic) that situates paralysis as signifying only immobility in every aspect of life.\* We all have able bodies. If we don't have able bodies we are dead – otherwise our bodies are working, they are able. The opposite of disabled is not able-bodied, it is non-disabled. Of course, the use of the term dis/Abled also contributes to the idea that disability is about ability. This particular term is used by some very well meaning disabled people and supporters. It is written this way to encourage people to focus on our abilities. However, the problem for disabled people is not a branding issue, it is oppression. The fact that women have proven that they are as smart and capable as men hasn't changed the reality that women still make roughly 70% of what men make (something that has changed little in several decades). And, to show what women are equally as competent as men, they don't feel the need to call themselves wo/Men. While dis/Abled often comes from a well intentioned place, it is individualistic and it falsely connects disability with ability which actually works to reinforce our oppression, not the other way around.

#### Use of the term ableism blocks effective resistance to discrimination

Egan 08

(Lisa, Disablism Vs. Ableism, lisybabe.blogspot.com/2008/05/disablism-vs-ableism.html)

Those of you who don't know, "ableism" is the American/Australian word for "disablism". And I think it's ludicrous. For one thing it reminds me of those ridiculously over-PC words like "handicapable" or "differently abled", which are only used by people who are trying to pretend that disability doesn't exist. Secondly, it's unclear what it actually means. If "disablism" is discriminating against people for being disabled, surely "ableism" is discriminating against people for being able? In season three, episode 18 of My Name Is Earl, Earl and Randy go into a "wheelchair bar". In this bar there are no chairs, so it's obviously discriminating against people who are able to walk thus haven't brought their own seat with them. That's what I would call "ableism". In reality, in the UK it is illegal to discriminate against someone for being disabled, but it is legal to discriminate against someone for not being disabled. So for example, it is legal to advertise a job as being for disabled applicants only. This I would also call "ableism" (though I don't think this is wrong). Someone on an Internet message board I use started a discussion on ableism. She was Australian, and angered that she had tried to introduce a non-disabled person to the concept of ableism. The non-disabled person laughed at such a ludicrous term. Obviously I did too, because it's a silly word. But this person laughed, because she didn't believe that such a thing existed. I wonder if she would have still laughed if Australians used the more accurately descriptive word "disablism". On that thread several people mentioned that they struggle to get non-disabled people to understand concepts of ableism. I never have any trouble getting people to understand disablism; could this be because of the language I use? I believe that calling disablism "ableism" is akin to calling racism "whiteism". I've heard some people disagree, and argue that grammatically "ableism" is more correct. I fail to see their point. If "racism" is discrimination on the grounds of race, surely it is logical that the word for discrimination on the grounds of disability would be "disablism"? I shall await the barrage of comments from people who have studied the English language in greater depth than me pointing out why I'm an idiot. So my appeal for this Blogging Against Disablism Day is for us all to call disablism what it really is. If we are using a word like "ableism" which tries to pretend that disability doesn't exist, how can we fight against discrimination on the basis of disability? If we're trying to pretend that disability doesn't exist, then how can discrimination on the basis of it exist? "Sexism", "racism" and "homophobia" are used by English speakers the whole world over. How are we supposed to expect non-disableds to fully understand concepts of disablism if we can't even come up with a unified word for it? Say it with me people: Diss-A-Buh-Lism. Then go and read what my cat had to say for BADD. Edit May 8th: Thanks for all the comments on this post. I was especially interested by the thoughtful comment by maudite entendante in which she said: Highly Obvious to me that the "abl-" in "ableism" is just the prefix form of "ability" (because, really, "abilityism" just isn't a possible English word), and it means "discrimination based on [amount or type or category of] ability" Looking at the term "ableism" in that context makes it clear that "ableism" is derived from the medical model of disability - the idea that a disability is something we have, that we are disabled by a lack of ability. I'm a believer in the social model of disability, the idea that we are disabled by barriers which prevent us from living as full and equal citizens. The term "disablism" doesn't have such obvious medical model roots. Another reason why I think this term is superior.

### 3

#### The absence of structural historicism in the 1AC is no mere oversight – the reliance on identity-based politics is not an accidental instance of ignoring class. The demand arises out of the crisis of liberalism – such politics particularizes the oppressions of capitalism to the point that the universal system in naturalized. Attaining white, male, bourgeoisie privilege becomes the benchmark of success, re-entrenching the foundation of the capitalist system.

Brown 93 (Wendy, Professor of PoliSci @ Berkeley, “Wounded Attachments”, Political Theory, p. 392)

Although **this détente between universal and particular within liberalism** is potted with volatile conceits, it **is rather thoroughly unraveled by two features of late modernity, spurred by developments in what Marx and Foucault**, respectively, **reveal as liberalism's companion powers: capitalism and disciplinarity. On one side, the state loses even its guise of universality as it becomes ever more transparently invested in particular economic interests,** political ends, and social formations. **This occurs as it shifts** from a relatively minimalist "night watchman" state **to a heavily bureaucratized, managerial, fiscally complex, and highly interventionist welfare-warfare state**, a transmogrification occasioned by the combined imperatives of capital and the autoproliferating characteristics of bureaucracy.**6 On the other side, a range of economic and political forces increasingly disinter the liberal subject from substantive** nation-state i**dentification**: deterritorializing demo- graphic flows; disintegration from within and invasion from without of family and community as (relatively) autonomous sites of social production and identification; consumer capitalism's marketing discourse in which individual (and subindividual) desires are produced, commodified, and mo- bilized as identities; and disciplinary productions of a fantastic array of behavior-based identities ranging from recovering alcoholic professionals to unrepentant crack mothers. **These disciplinary productions work to conjure and regulate subjects through classificatory schemes, naming and normaliz- ing social behaviors as social positions. Operating through what Foucault calls "an anatomy of detail," "disciplinary power" produces social identifies** (available for politicization because they are deployed for purposes of political regulation) **that crosscut juridical identities based on abstract right. Thus,** for example, **the welfare state's production of welfare subjects-themselves subdi- vided through the socially regulated categories of motherhood, disability, race, age, and so forth-potentially produce political identity through these categories, produce identities as these categories. In this story, the always imminent but increasingly politically manifest failure of liberal universalism to be universal**-the transparent fiction of state universality-**combines with the increasing individuation of social subjects through capitalist disinternments and disciplinary productions. Together, they breed the emergence of politicized identity rooted in disciplinary pro- ductions but oriented by liberal discourse toward protest against exclusion** from a discursive formation of universal justice. This production, however, is not linear or even but highly contradictory: although the terms of liberalism are part of the ground of production of a politicized identity that reiterates yet exceeds these terms, **liberal discourse itself** also **continuously recolonizes political identity as political interest-a conversion that recasts politicized identity's substantive and often deconstructive cultural claims and critiques as generic claims of particularism endemic to universalist political culture. Similarly, disciplinary power manages liberalism's production of politicized subjectivity by neutralizing** (re-depoliticizing) **identity through normalizing practices.** As liberal discourse converts political identity into essentialized private interest, disciplinary power converts interest into normativized social identity manageable by regulatory regimes. Thus disciplinary power politi- cally neutralizes entitlement claims generated by liberal individuation, whereas liberalism politically neutralizes rights claims generated by disciplinary identities. In addition to the formations of identity that may be the complex effects of disciplinary and liberal modalities of power, I want to suggest one other historical strand relevant to the production of politicized identity, this one hewn more specifically to recent developments in political culture. Although sanguine to varying degrees about the phenomenon they are describing, many on the European and North American Left have argued that identity politics emerges from the demise of class politics consequent to post-Fordism or pursuant to May 1968. Without adjudicating the precise relationship between the breakup of class politics and the proliferation of other sites of political identification, I want to refigure this claim by suggesting that what we have come to call identity politics is partly dependent on the demise of a critique of capitalism and of bourgeois cultural and economic values. In a reading that links the new identity claims to a certain relegitimation of capitalism, identity politics concerned with race, sexuality, and gender will appear not as a supplement to class politics, not as an expansion of Left categories of oppression and emancipation, not as an enriching complexification of pro- gressive formulations of power and persons-all of which they also are-but as tethered to a formulation of justice which, ironically, reinscribes a bour- geois ideal as its measure. If it is this ideal that signifies educational and vocational opportunity, upward mobility, relative protection against arbitrary violence, and reward in proportion to effort, and if it is this ideal against which many of the exclusions and privations of people of color, gays and lesbians, and women are articulated, then the political purchase of contemporary American identity politics would seem to be achieved in part through a certain discursive renaturalization of capitalism that can be said to have marked progressive discourse since the 1970s. What this suggests is that identity politics may be partly configured by a peculiarly shaped and peculiarly disguised form of resentment-class resent- ment without class consciousness or class analysis. This resentment is displaced onto discourses of injustice other than class but, like all resent- ments, retains the real or imagined holdings of its reviled subject-in this case, bourgeois male privileges-as objects of desire. From this perspective, it would appear that the articulation of politicized identities through race, gender, and sexuality require, rather than incidentally produce, a relatively limited identification through class. They necessarily rather than incidentally abjure a critique of class power and class norms precisely because the injuries suffered by these identities are measured by bourgeois norms of social acceptance, legal protection, relative material comfort, and social indepen- dence. The problem is that when not only economic stratification but other injuries to body and psyche enacted by capitalism (alienation, cornmodifica- tion, exploitation, displacement, disintegration of sustaining, albeit contra- dictory, social forms such as families and neighborhoods) are discursively normalized and thus depoliticized, other markers of social difference may come to bear an inordinate weight. Absent an articulation of capitalism in the political discourse of identity, the marked identity bears all the weight of the sufferings produced by capitalism in addition to that bound to the explicitly politicized marking.

#### The determinism of capital causes all their impacts – the dual technological instrumentalization of humanity and nature allows for both the devaluation of human life and accelerating destruction of the environment.

Dyer-Witherford 99 (professor of Library and Info. Sciences at the U of Western Ontario)   
[Nick. Cyber Marx: Cycles and Circuits of Struggle in High Technology Capitalism.]

**For capitalism, the use of machines as organs of “will over nature” is an imperative**. The great insight of the Frankfurt School—an insight subsequently improved and amplified by feminists and ecologists—was that **capital’s dual project of dominating both humanity and nature was intimately tied to the cultivation of “instrumental reason” that systematically objectifies, reduces, quantifies and fragments the world for the purposes of technological control**. Business’s systemic need to cheapen labor, cut the costs of raw materials, and expand consumer markets gives it an inherent bias toward the piling-up of technological power. **This priority—enshrined in phrases such as “progress,” “efficiency,” “productivity,” “modernization,” and “growth”—assumes an automatism that is used to override any objection or alternative, regardless of the environmental and social consequences. Today, we witness global vistas of toxification, deforestation, desertification, dying oceans, disappearing ozone layers, and disintegrating immune systems, all interacting in ways that perhaps threaten the very existence of humanity and are undeniably inflicting social collapse, disease, and immiseration across the planet.** The degree to which this project of mastery has backfired is all too obvious.

#### The alternative is to adopt a historical materialist perspective of analyzing disability through the lens of political economy – this is a more effective means of explaining and challenging the experiences and oppression faced by disabled people.

Oliver 99 (Michael J. Oliver, Professor of Disability Studies @ University of Greenwich, “Capitalism, Disability and Ideology: A Materialist Critique of Normalization Principle”, 1999, http://disability-studies.leeds.ac.uk/files/library/Oliver-cap-dis-ideol.pdf)

This interest has led me to begin to sketch out what a social theory of ¶ disability might look like (Oliver 1990) .For me, all social theory must be ¶ judged on three inter-related elements: its adequacy in describing ¶ experience; its ability to explain experience; and finally, its potential to ¶ transform experience. My own theorizing on disability is located in ¶ Marxist political economy which, I would argue offers a much more ¶ adequate basis for describing and explaining experience than does ¶ normalization theory which is based upon interactionist and functionalist ¶ sociology. ¶ In fact I would go further and argue that the social theory that underpins ¶ Marxist political economy has far greater transformative potential in ¶ eradicating the oppression that disabled people face throughout the ¶ world than the interactionist and functionalist theories that underpin ¶ normalization ever can have. And I will go even further than that and ¶ argue that already this theory has had a far greater influence on the ¶ struggles that disabled people are themselves currently engaged in to ¶ remove the chains of that oppression than normalization which is, at best ¶ a bystander in these struggles, and at worst part of the process of ¶ oppression itself. ¶ In presenting this argument, I will begin by articulating my own ¶ theoretical position based upon Marxist political economy and ¶ hereinafter referred to as materialist theory. I will then demonstrate the ¶ inadequacies of normalization theory's explanation of the rise of the ¶ institution before going on to provide a critique of the ideology which ¶ underpins it. Next, I will take issue with the argument that normalization ¶ has been successful because it is based upon 'experience'. Finally I will look at what both normalization and materialist theories say about ¶ change, having briefly described the appalling material conditions under ¶ which disabled people live throughout the world. ¶ Before proceeding further, it is perhaps necessary to explain the use of ¶ terminology in this chapter. Underpinning it is a materialist view of ¶ society; to say that the category disability is produced by capitalist ¶ society in a particular form implies a particular world view. within this ¶ world view, the production of the category disability is no different from ¶ the production of motor cars or hamburgers. Each has an industry, ¶ whether it be the car, fast food or human service industry. Each industry ¶ has a workforce which has a vested interest in producing their product in ¶ particular ways and in exerting as much control over the process of ¶ production as possible. ¶ Producing a materialist theory of disability ¶ The production of disability therefore is nothing more or less than a set ¶ of activities specifically geared towards producing a good - the category ¶ disability - supported by a range of political actions which create the ¶ conditions to allow these productive activities to take place and ¶ underpinned by a discourse which gives legitimacy to the whole ¶ enterprise. As to the specifics of the terminology used in this discourse, ¶ I use the term disabled people generically and refuse to divide the group ¶ in terms of medical conditions, functional limitation or severity of ¶ impairment. For me disabled people are defined in terms of three ¶ criteria; (i) they have an impairment; (ii) they experience oppression as a ¶ consequence; and (c) they identify themselves as a disabled person. ¶ Using the generic term does not mean that I do not recognise ¶ differences in experience within the group but that in exploring this we ¶ should start from the ways oppression differentially impacts on different ¶ groups of people rather than with differences in experience among ¶ individuals with different impairments. I agree that my own initial outlining ¶ of a materialist theory of disability (Oliver 1990) did not specifically ¶ include an examination of the oppression that people with learning ¶ difficulties face (and I use this particular term throughout my paper ¶ because it is the one democratic and accountable organisations of ¶ people with learning difficulties insist on). ¶ Nevertheless I agree that ¶ "For a rigorous theory of disability to emerge which ¶ begins to examine all disability in a materialist ¶ account, an analysis of normalization must be ¶ included". ¶ (Chappell 1992.38) ¶ Attempting to incorporate normalization in a materialist account however, ¶ does not mean that I believe that, beyond the descriptive, it is of much ¶ use. Based as it is upon functionalist and interactionist sociology, whose ¶ defects are well known (Gouldner1970), it offers no satisfactory ¶ explanation of why disabled people are oppressed in capitalist societies ¶ and no strategy for liberating us from the chains of that oppression. ¶ Political economy, on the other hand, suggests that all phenomena ¶ (including social categories) are produced by the economic and social ¶ forces of capitalism itself. The forms in which they are produced are ¶ ultimately dependent upon their relationship to the economy (Marx 1913) ¶ .Hence, the category disability is produced in the particular form it ¶ appears by these very economic and social forces. Further, it is ¶ produced as an economic problem because of changes in the nature of ¶ work and the needs of the labour market within capitalism. ¶ "The speed of factory work, the enforced discipline, ¶ the time-keeping and production norms -all these were ¶ a highly unfavourable change from the slower, more ¶ self-determined methods of work into which many ¶ handicapped people had been integrated" . ¶ (Ryan and Thomas 1980.101) ¶ The economy, through both the operation of the labour market and the ¶ social organisation of work, plays a key role in producing the category ¶ disability and in determining societal responses to disabled people. In ¶ order to explain this further, it is necessary to return to the crucial ¶ question of what is meant by political economy. The following is a ¶ generally agreed definition of political economy, ¶ "The study of the interrelationships between the polity, ¶ economy and society, or more specifically, the ¶ reciprocal influences among government the¶ economy, social classes, state and, status groups. ¶ The central problem of the political economy ¶ perspective is the manner in which the economy and ¶ polity interact in a relationship of reciprocal causation ¶ affecting the distribution of social goods". ¶ (Estes et al 1982)

### Case

#### Only a broad based political struggle focused on structural and institutional change can successfully combat oppression – the affirmatives turn inward makes that impossible by breaking apart coalitions and detracting from materially based confrontation

Mandle 2000, Professor of Sociology at Colgate University

(Joan, How Political is the Personal?: Identity Politics, Feminism and Social Change, userpages.umbc.edu/~korenman/wmst/identity\_pol.html)

The hegemony of identity politics within feminism, in my view, has helped to stymie the growth of a large scale feminist movement which could effectively challenge sexism and create the possibility of justice and fairness in our society. On the one hand identity politics makes the coalitions needed to build a mass movement for social change extremely difficult. With its emphasis on internal group solidarity and personal self-esteem, identity politics divides potential allies from one another. Difference feminism makes the task for example of including men in the struggle against sexism almost impossible, and even trying to change men's behavior or attitudes is made to seem futile because of the assumption that the sexes share so little. Indeed some difference feminists assert that women and men are so different from one another that they can hardly communicate across sex at all. The phrase "Men don't get it" too often implies that they "can't" get it, because, it is argued by difference feminists, only women have the capacity to really understand what other women are talking about. This of course is nonsense without any empirical validity, but identity politics so strongly stresses sex differences that this has come to be the accepted wisdom. But it is not just coalitions across sex that are assumed to be impossible, but coalitions among women as well. One of the problems with identity politics is that its assumptions can lead to an almost infinite number of smaller and smaller female identity groups. Identity politics puts a premium on valuing and exaggerating differences existing among women as well as those that are cross-sex. This makes large and potentially powerful feminist organizations difficult to sustain. One example of this effect was the problem of fractionalization within the National Women Studies Association (NWSA) some years ago, largely due to the many splits that occurred within its ranks. Identity groups organized within the organization pitting academic women against non-academic, Jewish women against non-Jews, women of color against white women, lesbians against straight women, lesbians of color against white lesbians, mothers against non-mothers and more. Each group focused on its own identity, its own victimization which it set up in competition with others' claims of victim status, and ins response to which it demanded recognition and concessions from the organization. The center - if it existed - simply could not hold and the organization, which had played a very important role in creating and supporting women's studies programs on campuses, was wracked by years of conflict from which it has only recently recovered. Thus, by stressing the characteristics which divide us, the logic of identity politics is that ultimately each individual is her own group. If each individual is different from all others, then to protect herself adequately she needs to be selfish - to ally with no one and to count only on herself to protect her interests. It is obvious that this stance makes it completely impossible to bring together the large numbers of people necessary to successfully press for social change. Coalitions fail to develop or are not even attempted. In this way, identity politics within feminism, as elsewhere, is basically conservative, working against progressive change and supporting the status quo. The divisions promoted by identity politics are especially pronounced today on college campuses. Not only between male and female students but also among students of different racial and ethnic backgrounds, differences are perceived as unbridgeable barriers and victimized status is a badge of honor. It is especially ironic that this separation is occurring at precisely the moment in history when real differences among students are less pronounced than ever in the past. American society is in fact culturally very homogeneous, as almost all young Americans who attend college grow up watching the same television programs, shopping at the same malls, listening to the same music, and eating the same fast food for large portions of their lives. Beginning salaries for students who graduate from elite universities have increasingly become similar by race and sex. But the identity politics which is hegemonic on such elite college campuses emphasizes difference above all else, even when students have trouble actually articulating what, in concrete terms, those significant differences are. The focus of attention within the context of identity politics becomes building solidarity and loyalty within one's own group. The outcome divides students from one another. Female students of different ethnic groups, for example, come to see themselves as having nothing in common with one another, and to compete over their relative degree of victimization. Feminist women of color, for example, on many campuses including Colgate's separate from white feminists, and take as a major task the goal of criticizing and creating guilt in white women students for their alleged racist attitudes. Similarly, within groups of women of color the same process occurs, with different ethnic groups dividing off and emphasizing the large differences among them. On other campuses, it is lesbian women who claim an especially oppressed status and, stressing their differences from straight women, critique the attitudes and behavior of heterosexual women towards them. Regardless of the merit of any particular critique, this model of identity politics effectively divides from one another those who could be allies in facing the many real problems - of poverty, violence, reproductive control, and work/ family conflicts - that women share when facing the world outside the university. Though in fact female college students share large numbers of issues around which they could build an inclusive movement to attack sexist behavior and attitudes, they turn inward, reinforcing their own feelings of victimization and loyalty, and typically turn outward only to attack one another. In addition to dividing potential allies from one another, identity politics' dominance of feminism creates other obstacles to effective struggles for social change. Its focus on personal identity produces a kind of a-political narcissism. Its attempt is to redefine politics as the attempt to know and assert "who I am" as part of a specifically narrow group. The notion that politics should involve responsibility toward others as well as toward oneself and toward whatever one defines as one's "own group" has been lost. The assertion of one's selfhood, concern with one's own self-esteem, as well as group loyalty become ends, the primary goals of political expression. In addition to its inward-looking focus, the strong emphasis on group loyalty characteristic of identity politics creates exaggerated emotional dependence on the group and consequently enormous pressure towards conformity and away from dissenting or independent thought. Stephen Carter, in his Confessions of An Affirmative Action Baby, exposes the damage done to independent and creative individual thinking that such a situation produces, again especially on college campuses. This exaggerated loyalty, then, also serves as an obstacle to the creation of an inclusive and thoughtful feminist politics. The Future of Feminism So where do we go from here? It is no doubt clear from my presentation today that my own politics are in strong contrast to identity politics. For a successful progressive politics to emerge again in our society, I believe that we need to create a political atmosphere where the zero-sum model of group competition gives way to coalitions among progressive groups to work on specific social problems; where personal issues of identity and self-esteem do not stymie individuals and groups' abilities to act politically; and where a unifying vision of fairness and social justice replaces the pessimistic focus on difference. For those of you who agree with me, we have a difficult but important task in front of us. Difficult especially now as we see in so many parts of the world from Kosovo to Rwanda the strength of identity politics in the form of nationalism - whether organized on religious, or cultural, or regional grounds - as a rallying cry for the most inhumane acts of violence among neighbors. Our task, then, does seem to run counter to a deep-seated tendency for human beings to react with fear and even hatred to differences, whether those differences are real, socially created, or imagined. For those of you who believe as I do, our task is to convince individuals and groups mired in the search for and affirmation of difference and victimization that it is in their interests to alter the sources of their victimization by joining with others to create a just society for all. This is not to say that individual or group conflicts will or can completely disappear. There are legitimate conflicts of interest in any society. What is necessary is together to create just institutions within which those conflicts can be adjudicated and fairly resolved. Indeed we must recognize that the only possible solution to the legitimate problems and conflicts groups face is such a broad movement for social justice. For feminism, these issues presently constitute a crisis of definition, as well as a choice about how to proceed. In Fire With Fire, Naomi Wolf offers a number of different definitions of feminism. Two however seem particularly instructive in the present context. In one portion of the book she advocates a definition of feminism that focuses on difference, on "more for women," including anything as feminist that "makes women stronger in ways that each woman is entitled to define for herself" and allowing that a woman is a feminist if she "respects herself" and is "operating at her full speed." This identity and difference-oriented definition is one direction in which feminism may continue to go. Feminists in this view would include Phyllis Schlafly and Margaret Thatcher for surely they respect themselves and believe they have defined ways to make women stronger. This brand of feminism would focus on getting more for women regardless of the implication for others and would advocate the use of their newly attained power for good or evil, as they individually decide. For reasons outlined in this paper, I reject this view. In the same book, however, Wolf proposes another definition of feminism. Here she emphasizes feminism's essence as a movement for a socially more just society. This then is the other possible direction that feminism today could take, reaching out to others who share a commitment to a just and egalitarian society and building the coalitions necessary to exercise the power to move in that direction. Concrete examples of such possibilities abound. Poor women, especially the young who cannot afford abortions, could join with middle class pro-choice advocates in pressing for the federal funding necessary if all women are to have real reproductive control. The crisis in day care - both its inadequate availability and quality - has the potential to unite working parents of all ethnicities and social classes. Issues such as rape, battering, and sexual harassment cut across class and race and age, pointing the way to broad-based coalitions of women and men who are outraged by these crimes. And the continued low-pay, dead end, and sex stereotyped jobs in which women find themselves could be addressed as part of the broader fight for better education and higher paying jobs in the American economy as a whole, as feminists join with unions and other advocates of higher incomes for working people. These and other issues have the potential of combining the political influence of disparate groups which can agree on specific issues and are willing to work together to effect concrete change in the functioning of our laws and institutions. As we look to our future, we also need to be cognizant of our past. In the early 1960s when the Second Wave of feminism began, the women's movement was separate, but at the same time part of a larger number of groups - Civil Rights, anti-war, New Left, student groups - committed to and optimistic about constructing a more just society for all. These earliest feminists understood that women's personal problems had social origins and that they thus required political solutions, necessarily involving the entire society. If today we focus only on ourselves, our differences, and on our own victimization, we risk repeating the mistake made by feminism in the later l960s and early 1970s. At that time, some feminist activists began using small consciousness raising groups in a therapeutic fashion, as a way of focusing primarily on their own personal problems. Discouraged about the extent of sexism they had uncovered and demoralized by seeing themselves as its victims, they turned inward, preoccupied with the personally damaging effects of sexism. They abandoned consciousness raising groups as a way of linking themselves with others, as a way of connecting personal issues to political activism in the wider society. Isolated from larger struggles for social justice, most consciousness raising groups collapsed within a very short number of years.Today's identity politics, both in the form of difference and victim feminism, poses a similar danger to a successful struggle to overcome sexism. The personal in these contexts is not political, primarily because it involves separation from political engagement with others in society. Rather it accepts the pessimistic - ultimately conservative - view that victimization is not amenable to change through political struggle. It accepts the notion that difference between women and men makes coalition impossible and sexism inevitable. In contrast, we need to affirm the early women's movements' insight that the personal - sexism in personal relationships, the tragedy of sexual violence or abuse, the division of housework within families, or the poverty that women disproportionately experience - can be an important factor in creating a politics of engagement. By so doing, we can join with others to construct a vision and politics that promises real democratic participation, self-determination, and egalitarian justice for all.

#### The affirmatives performances of self trades off with collective mobilization to address the structural repression of people of color. They offer the false hope of symbolic solutions to material problems

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(Mari, “Taking Conversation, Dialogue, and Therapy Public ,” Rhetoric & Public Affairs 8.3 (2005) 405-430)

Approaching public controversies through a conversational model informed by therapy also enables political inaction in two respects. First, an open-ended process lacking mechanisms for closure thwarts progress toward resolution. As Freeman writes of consciousness raising, an unstructured, informal discussion [End Page 418] "leaves people with no place to go and the lack of structure leaves them with no way of getting there."70 Second, the therapeutic impulse to emphasize the self as both problem and solution ignores structural impediments constraining individual agency. "Therapy," Cloud argues, "offers consolation rather than compensation, individual adaptation rather than social change, and an experience of politics that is impoverished in its isolation from structural critique and collective action." Public discourse emphasizing healing and coping, she claims, "locates blame and responsibility for solutions in the private sphere."71 Clinton's Conversation on Race not only exemplified the frequent wedding of public dialogue and therapeutic themes but also illustrated the failure of a conversation-as-counseling model to achieve meaningful social reform. In his speech inaugurating the initiative, Clinton said, "Basing our self-esteem on the ability to look down on others is not the American way . . . Honest dialogue will not be easy at first . . . Emotions may be rubbed raw, but we must begin." Tempering his stated goal of "concrete solutions" was the caveat that "power cannot compel" racial "community," which "can come only from the human spirit." Following the president's cue to self-disclose emotions, citizens chiefly aired personal experiences and perspectives during the various community dialogues. In keeping with their talk-show formats, the forums showcased what Orlando Patterson described as "performative 'race' talk," "public speech acts" of denial, proclamation, defense, exhortation, and even apology, in short, performances of "self" that left little room for productive public argument. Such personal evidence overshadowed the "facts" and "realities" Clinton also had promised to explore, including, for example, statistics on discrimination patterns in employment, lending, and criminal justice or expert testimony on cycles of dependency, poverty, illegitimacy, and violence. Whereas Clinton had encouraged "honest dialogue" in the name of "responsibility" and "community," Burke argues that "The Cathartic Principle" often produces the reverse. "[C]onfessional," he writes, "contains in itself a kind of 'personal irresponsibility,' as we may even relieve ourselves of private burdens by befouling the public medium." More to the point, "a thoroughly 'confessional' art may enact a kind of 'individual salvation at the expense of the group,'" performing a "sinister function, from the standpoint of overall-social necessities." Frustrated observers of the racial dialogue—many of them African Americans—echoed Burke's concerns. Patterson, for example, noted, "when a young Euro-American woman spent nearly five minutes of our 'conversation' in Martha's Vineyard . . . publicly confessing her racial insensitivities, she was directly unburdening herself of all sorts of racial guilt feeling. There was nothing to argue about."75 Boston Globe columnist Derrick Z. Jackson invoked the game metaphor communication theorists often link to [End Page 419] skills in conversation,76 voicing suspicion of a talking cure for racial ailments that included neither exhaustive racial data nor concrete goals. "The game," wrote Jackson, "is to get 'rid' of responsibility for racism while doing nothing to solve it." Contributing to the ineffectiveness of a therapeutic approach in redressing social problems is its common pairing with what Burke terms "incantatory" imagery, wherein rhetors invite persons to see themselves in an idealized form. Comparing a current conflicted self against a future self individuals aspire to become is a therapeutic staple, a technique Clinton mimics in his speech on race. In one breath, he acknowledges persistent racial "discrimination and prejudice"; in another, he overtly invites audience members to picture themselves in saintly fashion: "Can we be one America respecting, even celebrating, our differences, but embracing even more what we have in common?"79 But outside private therapy, this strategy rarely results in honest self-disclosure, especially regarding thorny issues such as race. Andrew Hacker argues that individuals seldom speak candidly about race in public; rather, they express an "idealized" self with ideas and feelings they desire or, more commonly, believe they should possess, a phenomenon evident even in anonymous polling.80 The hazard of blending the confessional with the incantatory, Burke writes, is a "sentimental and hypocritical" false reassurance that society is on the proper course, rendering remedial action unnecessary.81 This danger is compounded if the problem initially has been couched as essentially attitudinal rather than structural, as Clinton did: "We have torn down the barriers in our laws. Now we must break down the barriers in our lives, our minds and our hearts."82 Indeed, in commenting on the therapeutic bent of the Conversation on Race, William L. Taylor argues that the late Bayard Rustin's reservations about the social-psychological approach to race were prescient: "Rustin said he could envision America being persuaded figuratively to lie down on the psychiatrist's couch to examine their feelings about race. They would likely arise, he said, pronouncing themselves either free or purged of any bias. And nothing would have changed."83 Furthermore, identification intrinsic in narrative experiences is double-edged; while identification can neutralize domination by creating empathy, identification also can fortify hegemony. As Cornell West warns, the privileging of emotional responses to racism and racial self-identities over other data can contribute to "racial reasoning," which blacks employ to their peril. To illustrate, he points to the failure of black leadership to challenge the qualifications by typical measures of black Supreme Court nominee Clarence Thomas, opting instead to submit to deceptive racial solidarity built upon premises of "black authenticity." Because the problems plaguing contemporary black America, West writes, result from a complex amalgam of structural and behavioral factors, weaving solutions demands analysis of data beyond subjective personal narratives and performances of self-identity. The Conversation on Race visibly demonstrates the inertia endemic in a discursive model lacking direction and mechanisms for closure. Five months into the racial dialogue, White House aides conceded no consensus had emerged even on fundamental goals: whether the initiative should formulate race-related policy or merely explore racial attitudes.86 Moreover, Clinton himself expressed weariness over the failure in public meetings to move beyond the repetitive airing of personal opinion on issues such as affirmative action,87 concurring with critics that "we need structure for the discussion . . . so we can actually get something done."88 Months more of racial conversation, however, produced few substantive results. The University of New Hampshire's extended dialogue over the proposed conversational forum engendered similar fatigue and inaction. Arguments forwarded by both camps centered on pivotal differences between "debate" and "conversation," problem-solving tasks and relational aims, and formal and informal modes of gauging opinions. Ironically, more than one lengthy "conversation" over the conversational proposal produced no action, leading one exhausted participant to observe, "This [process] goes to the heart of my frustration with ever making this [conversational Forum] viable."89 As Burke maintains, while some symbolic forms contain "a 'way in,' 'way through,' and 'way out,'" others "lead us in and leave us there."90 Finally, a key weakness in a dialogic model for treating systemic social problems is its reliance on a crucial non-sequitur: increased intimacy will spawn an ethic of care, which, in turn, will produce an ethic of justice.91 But at the University of New Hampshire, the mistrust and estrangement that a "real conversation" purportedly would rectify had resulted, not from a lack of familiarity among principals, but from structural concerns, including the widening gap between faculty and administrative salaries, shrinking resources, and maneuvers to erode faculty governance. Likewise, the personal proximity between white families and their black slaves or servants reveals that intimacy means little in the face of structural inequities, nor does it necessarily induce removal of injustices. Illustrative is the recent revelation that South Carolina senator Strom Thurmond had fathered a daughter by his family's black domestic in 1925, an intimacy that failed to alter the 1948 Dixiecrat presidential candidate's stance on segregation.92 Similarly, although the lessening of hostility over abortion reported by some participants in the Public Conversations Project may have some merit, project leaders themselves concede their "vision for a 'conflict resolution' process for a complex issue [such as abortion] is not necessarily resolution."93 As such, the utility of such dialogues on public policies affecting the material lives of women seeking legal reproductive choices is sorely limited. As [End Page 421] Burke notes when drawing crucial distinctions between psychological and material spheres, "[T]o some degree, solution of conflict must always be done purely in the symbolic realm (by 'transcendence') if it is to be done at all." Still, a "symbolic drama," he writes, differs from "the drama of living . . . and [its] real obstacles . . . Hence, at times [people] try to solve symbolically kinds of conflict that can and should be solved by material means. Indeed, as Clinton rightly said in launching his Conversation on Race, political or military power cannot compel caring. Yet political power can command justice as evidenced in the nation's record of dismantling racial and gender barriers through judicial and legislative means.

#### It’s not just that the aff doesn’t solve but that it is actively harmful by inviting political inaction. A turn towards the personal is a turn away from the structural dimensions of social problems

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(Mari, “Taking Conversation, Dialogue, and Therapy Public ,” Rhetoric & Public Affairs 8.3 (2005) 405-430)

Fourth, a communicative model that views public issues through a relational, personal, or therapeutic lens nourishes hegemony by inviting political inaction. Whereas the objective of conventional public argument is achieving an instrumental goal such as a verdict or legislation, the aim of social conversation generally stops with self-expression. As Schudson puts it, "Conversation has no end outside itself."39 Similarly, modeling therapeutic paradigms that trumpet "talking cures" can discourage a search for political solutions to public problems by casting cathartic talk as sufficient remedy. As Campbell's analysis of consciousness-raising groups in the women's liberation movement points out, "[S]olutions must be structural, not merely personal, and analysis must move beyond personal experience and feeling . . . Unless such transcendence occurs, there is no persuasive campaign . . . [but] only the very limited realm of therapeutic, small group interaction."40 Finally, and related, a therapeutic framing of social problems threatens to locate the source and solution to such ills solely within the individual, the "self-help" on which much therapy rests. A postmodern therapeutic framing of conflicts as relational misunderstandings occasioned by a lack of dialogue not only assumes that familiarity inevitably breeds caring (rather than, say, irritation or contempt) but, more importantly, provides cover for ignoring the structural dimensions of social problems such as disproportionate black poverty. If objective reality is unavoidably a fiction, as Sheila McNamee claims, all suffering can be dismissed as psychological rather than based in real, material circumstance, enabling defenders of the status quo to admonish citizens to "heal" themselves.

#### The affirmatives emphasis on personal empowerment fortify’s hegemonic structures by containing dissent

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(Mari, “Taking Conversation, Dialogue, and Therapy Public ,” Rhetoric & Public Affairs 8.3 (2005) 405-430)

As the last century neared its close, the second-wave feminist slogan "The Personal Is Political" was turned on its head: the political became highly personalized. In this new politics of intimacy, candidates whistlestopped on Oprah Winfrey, political journalists posed as psychotherapists, and President "I feel your pain" Clinton presided in the popular imagination as The Great Empathizer and the Commander in Grief. Emblematic of this conflation of the private and the public was the increasing casting of social controversies such as affirmative action, escalating crime, and welfare reform in the language of "conversation," "dialogue," and the therapeutic talk of healing, dysfunction, coping, self-esteem, and empowerment. Among academics, this cult of conversation has been championed most ardently by communitarian political theorists, civic journalists, cultural feminists, postmodernists, multiculturalists, family therapists, and a number of communication scholars concerned with identity, the public sphere, conflict and negotiation, and counseling. In many cases, the rationale for a conversational [End Page 405] turn in the ways citizens conduct business, solve problems, and approach conflict is couched in a language interpolating "conversation" or "dialogue" with spirituality and therapy. Particularly visible is Deborah Tannen's 1998 bestseller The Argument Culture: Moving from Debate to Dialogue, wherein she blames a culture of critique for "corroding our spirit." Likewise, the earlier The Conversation of Journalism proposed supplanting the "disabling" monological approach to news reporting with a more inclusive dialogic paradigm overtly engaging citizens.3 So, too, at the University of New Hampshire in the late 1990s, administrators and some faculty proposed replacing the existing Academic Senate, which they termed "dysfunctional," with a nonvoting University Forum aimed to "advance functional conversation" and attendant community.4 And the conflation of the conversational and therapeutic for approaching public controversies is made explicit in the Boston Public Conversations Project, premised on "[t]he idea that family therapy skills can be fruitfully applied in the realm of 'public conversations'" on "divisive public issues" such as abortion.5 Perhaps the most conspicuous effort at replacing public debate with therapeutic dialogue was President Clinton's Conversation on Race, launched in mid-1997. Controversial from its inception for its ideological bent, the initiative met further widespread criticism for its encounter-group approaches to racial stratification and strife, critiques echoing previously articulated concerns—my own among them6 —that certain dangers lurk in employing private or social communication modes for public problem-solving Since then, others have joined in contesting the treating of public problems with narrative and psychological approaches, which—in the name of promoting civility, cooperation, personal empowerment, and socially constructed or idiosyncratic truths—actually work to contain dissent, locate systemic social problems solely within individual neurosis, and otherwise fortify hegemony.

# 2NC

**Who is here to speak about their experience at Guantanamo? Discussions of the topic are vitally important to challenge Islamaphobic policies like the US’s detention practices. They exist precisely because they’re something “out there” and it’s productive to bring the voices of those who can’t be here to speak for themselves. This isn’t to say that personal experience isn’t valuable but that there are other important considerations**

**Park 10**

[2010, James Park, “EFFECTUATING PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE IN ENDING INDEFINITE DETENTION: HISTORICAL REPETITION AND THE CASE OF THE UYGHURS”, 31 Whittier L. Rev. 785]

George **Orwell once wrote** in The Road to Wigan Pier regarding empire and the complicity of a nation that enjoys its fruits: For in the last resort, **the only important question is, Do you want the British Empire to hold together or do you want it to disintegrate**?... For, apart from any other consideration, **the high standard of life we enjoy in England depends upon our keeping a tight hold on the Empire, particularly the tropical portions of it such as India and Africa**. Under the capitalist system, **in order that England may live in comparative comfort, a hundred million Indians must live on the verge of starvation**. 128 **How the** old British **Empire relates to the detention of Haitians and Uyghurs at Guantanamo Bay involves the very question of conscious awareness and the difficulties in piercing the veil of physical and metaphysical detachment**. 129 **Descriptions of events transcribed through the filter of media form a buffer to action due to its intangible nature**-**there is an unreality to the medium of televisio**n where elements of reality that play across the screen can take on the discursive properties of the imaginary. 130 As a result, **there can be quiet and passive acquiescence when terms, such as, "exceptional," "unprecedented," and "the normal rules do not apply" are heard and used to form the exigencies and justifications for "intensive interrogation methods" and indefinite detention without charge.** 131 Spatial separation and isolation also create impediments to rectifying injustice. In the case of the Haitian refugees, service organizations had to go through the judiciary and spend years in litigation to gain access to the refugees at Guantanamo Bay. 13 In the case of Guantanamo Bay detainees caught up in the "War on Terror," there were explicated policies against denying access. 133 For instance, "[a] confidential 2003 manual for operating the Guantanamo detention center shows that military officials had a policy of denying detainees access to independent monitors" from the Red Cross. 134 In other words, those who had done no wrong were denied access and, as a result, justice. **The indefinite detention of the Haitians and Uyghurs and the years they have spent and are spending in extra-territorial detention can**, similarly, **be examined through the prism of "punishment" as there have been alterations to the order and methodology of punishment and incarceration over time**. 135 **Punishment has changed from something that was acutely visible to something that has become cloaked and secreted away**. 136 At one time, **the public spectacle of punishment took center stage** as a gory spectacle of physical pain. 137 These dramatic displays of "justice" provided all concerned with a specific role: The criminal to be punished acted as the star, the innocent public witnesses supplied the captivated audience, and the government authority directed this macabre melodrama. 138 These displays **were** therefore **meant to educate both the individual criminals living** (or in some cases dying), **as well as the watching public as to the concepts of justice and punishment.** 139 **These theatrics later gave way to a less sensational mode of education which focused less on physical torment** in pursuit of justice **and sought to internalize a sense of a moral code** in all individuals. 140 Thus, **what was once a passive group of mere voyeurs has been disbanded to become a cluster of individual productions**-**each person now internalizes and imagines the process of punishment through the censored lens of courtroom dramas and the scripted cinema of the prison yard in popular culture**, **rather than bear witness to the realities of society's retribution. This more sanitary, internal approach to punishment is particularly pronounced when examined in the context of the "War on Terror."** In this instance, **the institutions of punishment are not only removed from the public eye, but from the very soil of our nation**. 141 In point of fact, **Guantanamo Bay is based in a country where United States citizens cannot visit without obtaining a license through the United States government** due to a long-existing trade embargo which has only recently been revisited. 142 **Guantanamo Bay has been argued to be territory that is outside the bounds of United States' sovereignty**, thereby, **prohibiting detainees from invoking habeas corpus to challenge their detention.** 143 Proponents of this argument used the United States Supreme Court decision in Johnson v. Eisentrager, decided in 1950, which held that those detained in territories beyond the borders of United States sovereignty are unable to invoke the writ of habeas corpus. 144 Thus, Guantanamo Bay was argued to be the sovereign territory of the nation of Cuba as a convenient fiction despite the years of isolation between the two nations. 145 **This argument was shattered when the United States Supreme Court held that habeas corpus for "War on Terror" detainees was due in Boumediene v. Bus**h, decided in 2008. 146 Even **further tucked away from the public eye are the secret prisons-socalled "black sites"-instituted by the Bush Administration**, operating extra-judicially and containing the faceless "ghost detainee," subject to "intensive interrogation methods."' 147 **As the form of punishment and detention shifts further afield, it takes on a profound dimension of separation**. George **Orwell**, in the excerpt above, **was alluding to the natural tendency to accept the conditions with which people are presented.** **The automatic supposition that what may be taking placing is unjust and perhaps beyond the constitutional limits can be seemingly driven from conscious awareness by the public's separation from events and the lack of information**. As a consequence, **justice has proceeded at a slow, aggravated plod in rectifying wrong where**, oftentimes, **individuals are simply "released" quietly after years of imprisonment without the subject of their innocence ever being addressed.**

#### Our framework creates stronger forms of advocacy

Galloway 7

[Ryan, Director of Debate and assistant professor in Communication Studies at Samford University, “DINNER AND CONVERSATION AT THE ARGUMENTATIVE TABLE: RECONCEPTUALIZING DEBATE AS AN ARGUMENTATIVE DIALOGUE”, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 28, MW]

However, this does not mean that debaters are victims. The sophistication of modern argument and the range of strategic choices available to modern debaters allow them to choose positions that are consistent with their belief structures. The rise of plan-inclusive counterplans, kritiks, and other strategies allow negative teams to largely align themselves with agreeable affirmative cases while distinguishing away narrow slivers of arguments that allow debaters to rarely argue completely against their convictions. While some contend that this undermines the value of switch-side debate (Ellis, 2008b; Shanahan, 2004), in fact, the notion that debaters employ nuanced answers to debate topics illustrates the complexity of modern debate resolutions. Those who worry that competitive academic debate will cause debaters to lose their convictions, as Greene and Hicks do in their 2005 article, confuse the cart with the horse. Conviction is not a priori to discussion, it flows from it. A. Craig Baird argued, “Sound conviction depends upon a thorough understanding of the controversial problem under consideration (1955, p. 5). Debate encourages rigorous training and scrutiny of arguments before debaters declare themselves an advocate for a given cause. Debate creates an ethical obligation to interrogate ideas from a neutral position so that they may be freely chosen subsequently. A second reason to reject the topic has to do with its

#### Being germane doesn’t cut it – they still link to all of our offense

Galloway 7

[Ryan, Director of Debate and assistant professor in Communication Studies at Samford University, “DINNER AND CONVERSATION AT THE ARGUMENTATIVE TABLE: RECONCEPTUALIZING DEBATE AS AN ARGUMENTATIVE DIALOGUE”, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 28]

For example, an affirmative case on the 2007-2008 college topic might defend neither state nor international action in the Middle East, and yet claim to be germane to the topic in some way. The case essentially denies the arguments that state action is oppressive or that actions in the international arena are philosophically or pragmatically suspect. Instead of allowing for the dialogue to be modified by the interchange of the affirmative case and the negative response, the affirmative subverts any meaningful role to the negative team, preventing them from offering effective “counter-word” and undermining the value of a meaningful exchange of speech acts. Germaneness and other substitutes for topical action do not accrue the dialogical benefits of topical advocacy.

#### Only formal, pre-agreed rules can ensure openness and equal access—throwing away limits doesn’t mean debate becomes more egalitarian; it means those with the most power dominate the discussion- turns the aff

Mari Boor Tonn, Associate Professor of Communication at the University of Maryland, College Park, 2005

“Taking Conversation, Dialogue, and Therapy Public ,” Rhetoric & Public Affairs 8.3 (2005) 405-430

Second, democratic processes and public problem solving necessarily diverge from social conversations by articulating objectives at the outset; adhering to formal rules for participating in, managing, and achieving problem resolution; and documenting outcomes. Through the scrupulous recording of motions, discussions, amendments, and votes, the dynamics of such joint action are rendered visible, accessible, and retrievable, even to persons not party to the immediate deliberative process. "Democracies," Schudson writes, "put great store in the power of writing to secure, verify, and make public. Democracies require public memories."32 Thus, contrary to the framing of conversation and dialogue as egalitarian public problem-solving models, they, in truth, can reify pecking orders by licensing group members with social authority to set agendas, steer and dominate discussion, and—absent the polling and recording of votes—interpret the "will" of the group. Moreover, such informal processes can reward those who speak the loudest, the longest, are the most articulate, or even the most recalcitrant. Freeman's analysis of consciousness-raising groups is instructive: At any small group meeting anyone with a sharp eye and an acute ear can tell who is influencing whom. The members of the friendship group will relate more to each other than to other people. They listen more attentively, and interrupt less; they repeat each other's points and tend to give in amiably; they tend to ignore or grapple with the "outs" whose approval is not necessary for making a decision . . . They are nuances of interaction, not prewritten scripts. But they are discernible, and they do have their effect. Once one knows . . . whose approval is the stamp of acceptance, one knows who is running things.33 As a result, Freeman argues that purportedly "structureless" organizations are a "deceptive . . . smokescreen," given that "'structurelessness' does not prevent the formation of informal structures, but only formal ones . . . For everyone to have the opportunity to be involved . . . and to participate . . . the structure must be explicit, not implicit. The rules of decision-making must be open and available to everyone, and this can only happen if they are formalized."34 Schudson likewise argues that the inherently "threatening" nature of political deliberation demands procedures guaranteeing "equal access to the [End Page 411] floor, equal participation in setting the ground rules for discussion, and a set of ground rules designed to encourage pertinent speaking, attentive listening, appropriate simplifications, and widely apportioned speaking rights."35

#### We can’t debate if we can’t anticipate the topic of discussion

Ruth Lessl Shively, Assoc Prof Polisci at Texas A&M, 2000 Political Theory and Partisan Politics p. 181-2

The requirements given thus far are primarily negative. The ambiguists must say "no" to—they must reject and limit—some ideas and actions. In what follows, we will also find that they must say "yes" to some things. In particular, they must say "yes" to the idea of rational per­suasion. This means, first, that they must recognize the role of agreement in political contest, or the basic accord that is necessary to discord. The mistake that the ambiguists make here is a common one. The mistake is in thinking that agreement marks the end of contest—that consen­sus kills debate. But this is true only if the agreement is perfect—if there is nothing at all left to question or contest. In most cases, however, our agreements are highly imperfect. We agree on some matters but not on others, on generalities but not on specifics, on principles but not on their applications, and so on. And this kind of limited agreement is the starting condition of contest and debate. As John Courtney Murray writes: We hold certain truths; therefore we can argue about them. It seems to have been one of the corruptions of intelligence by positivism to assume that argument ends when agreement is reached. In a basic sense, the reverse is true. There can be no argument except on the premise, and within a context, of agreement. (Murray 1960, 10) In other words, we cannot argue about something if we are not com­municating: if we cannot agree on the topic and terms of argument or if we have utterly different ideas about what counts as evidence or good argument. At the very least, we must agree about what it is that is being debated before we can debate it. For instance, one cannot have an argument about euthanasia with someone who thinks euthanasia is a musical group. One cannot successfully stage a sit-in if one's target audience simply thinks everyone is resting or if those doing the sitting have no complaints. Nor can one demonstrate resistance to a policy if no one knows that it is a policy. In other words, contest is meaningless if there is a lack of agreement or communication about what is being contested. Resisters, demonstrators, and debaters must have some shared ideas about the subject and/or the terms of their disagree­ments. The participants and the target of a sit-in must share an under­standing of the complaint at hand. And a demonstrator's audience must know what is being resisted. In short, the contesting of an idea presumes some agreement about what that idea is and how one might go about intelligibly contesting it. In other words, contestation rests on some basic agreement or harmony.

#### People with disabilities have a long history of using organizations to further self-advocacy – they’ve been empirically successful in challenging society’s definitions – coalitional politics with a focus on structural issues is the best option

Enns no date – doctorate of Law, wheelchair user, and disability advocate (Henry, “The Role of Organizations of Disabled People: A Disabled Peoples' International Discussion Paper” <http://www.independentliving.org/docs5/RoleofOrgDisPeople.html>)

C. The Growth of Organizations Ultimately, disabled people began to form their own organizations to represent themselves. They revised society's definitions of them as "sick" and as being punished by God. They redefined themselves as citizens with rights -- the same rights as all other human beings -- to medical and social services, education, transportation, employment, housing and family life. The first organizations of disabled people were blind uni-disability groups, and some deaf groups, and then multi-disability organizations were formed in many countries. The organizing process began in the 1950's in some countries. By 1980 there were at least uni-disability organizations in some 50 countries. (Driedger, 1987) Uni-disability, international organizations such as the International Federation of the Blind and the World Federation of the Deaf, were founded in the 1950's and 1960's. By 1980, a multi-disability international organization was conceived in Winnipeg -- Disabled Peoples' International. Since 1980, particularly through DPI's Leadership Training Program, new multi-disability local and national organizations have sprung up in an additional 50 countries. The philosophy of these organizations is one of "self-representation" and a "rights" orientation. They also believe that all disabilities united into one organization provides a stronger voice for change than each disability group speaking out separately. What, then, is the role of organizations of disabled people? D. The role of organization of disabled people 1. Self-representation - "A voice of our own" Disabled people's organizations believe that people with disabilities are their own best spokespersons. DPI's motto is this, "A voice of our own". This premise is the backbone of the movement. For too long, medical and social work professionals, and extended families, have spoken for people with disabilities. In the words of Ed Roberts, a disabled American, "...when others speak for you, you lose." (Roberts, 1983, p. 7) Disabled people believe that they best know the needs and aspirations of disabled people. They will represent themselves to governments, service providers, the United Nations and the public. As mentioned earlier, people with disabilities redefined themselves as citizens with rights, not as patients and clients of professionals, nor as beggars asking for hand-outs. As the National Council of Disabled Persons of Zimbabwe (NCDPZ) believes, "Our role is to act as a voice of the disabled. We are a 'civil rights' organization of the disabled formed to conscientize the disabled about their rights and to fight for the right to access to all community services". (NCPDZ "A Voice", 1983, p. 1) To assert their rights, disabled people believe that all disability groups must be united into national disabled people's organizations, and of course, DPI, an international united front. As Jim Derksen urged disabled Canadians in 1975: "Let us reason together, let us deliberate on our problems and needs, let us consider our abilities, and when we have agreed on the problems and solutions let us articulate our opinions and ideas in a strong and united voice." (Derksen, 1975, p.1a)

#### Organizational decision making can address the structural issues that force society to be exclusive in the first place

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2. Identifying grassroots needs Organizations of disabled people arise in response to a group of people's perception that there are barriers to participation for disabled people in society that need to be addressed. These organizations are based on the needs and aspirations developed by the disabled grassroots community. The disabled people who start such organizations are usually educated and are better off financially than the majority of disabled persons in their countries. Their educational advantage causes these disabled persons to identify and analyze the barriers that bar the participation of people with disabilities in society. They have learned the tools that the rest of society uses and they turn them towards the benefit of all disabled people, who are in some developing countries, 99% illiterate. Furthermore it is disabled people who must identify their own needs and how to meet them. Paulo Freire explains in Pedagogy of the Oppressed: "... those who recognize, or begin to recognize themselves as oppressed must be among the developers of the pedagogy. No pedagogy that is truly liberating can remain distant from the oppressed by treating them as unfortunates and by presenting for their emulation models from among the oppressors. The oppressed must be their own example in the struggle for their redemption." (Freire, 1970, p. 39) Indeed, disabled people in their organizations identify the forces that oppress them, and organize to overcome those forces -- physical and attitudinal barriers.

#### Organizational decision making renders the government accessible to people with disabilities

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Organizations of disabled people fulfill the role of a vehicle to represent the needs of disabled people to decision-makers and service-providers at the local, national and international levels. Their representatives make presentations to decision-makers. In the case of DPI its members are multi­disability organizations of disabled people, and thus decision-makers can hear a united voice. In the past, in many countries, before the advent of multi-disability groups, many uni-disability groups would present their varying points of view without consulting other groups of people with disabilities. Government found it difficult to know which group to give priority to in the consultation process. As O'Rourke of the American Coalition of Citizens with Disabilities (ACCD) stated: "For a long time was a big problem with disabled groups in America because when the legislation was brought before the Congress, perhaps forty different groups would go to Congress. Each had a different position.. It became very difficult for the people within the government themselves to make decisions." (O'Rourke, 1978, p. 51) The American disabled citizens formed a multi-disability coalition to surmount this problem. Forrester, of the Combined Disabilities Association in Jamaica reiterates the important role of organizations in the consultation process: "It is more convenient and advantageous to make representatives to government concerning change or to lobby political leaders as associations, since politicians are more liable too act where they perceive that proposals are being made by associations rather than individuals". (Forrester, 1985, p. 7) Indeed, government planners can discover what the majority of disabled people want. Too often priorities are set in social services that have little to do with the actual needs of disabled people. It, thus, is good economic and policy planning to include disabled persons in the planning process because they are the ones that best know the needs of disabled people: "Most frequently in the past, programs, even in America, were designed by people who themselves were not very close to the problem. Disabled people themselves often know how to deal with situations when people who are not disabled need to think about how this problem should be handled. This thought itself is still only theory because they are not disabled themselves, and lacking experience they have difficulty coming up with simple solutions." (O'Rourke, 1978, p. 50)

#### **Movements should focus on institutional change – this is empirically successful**

DSQ 3, Disability Studies Quarterly, http://dsq-sds.org/article/view/399/545

The history of the efforts of the disability rights movement on behalf of legislation which would facilitate the attainment of its twin goals of the inclusion and empowerment of persons with disabilities can be said to begin in the 1950s. Specifically, it can be traced (Varela 1983: 35) to the "paralyzed veterans . . . fighting for more parking spaces, and for more accessible commodes . . ." and to the fight by people with disabilities "for local and state accessibility laws throughout the 1950s." The first significant federal legislation advancing the goals of the movement came in 1965 with the creation of the National Commission on Architectural Barriers to the Rehabilitation of the Handicapped. The Commission was to "study the problems involved in making all federal buildings accessible to disabled citizens" (Varela 1983: 36). However, the import of the work of the Commission on such problems is not limited to problems of access. As Varela (1983: 36) observes, "the work of the Commission, and, more importantly, of disabled activists . . . [changed] attitudes toward disability . . . ." The change was from "an emphasis on services (that is, on doing something about 'those people')" to "an emphasis on civil rights (that is, the notion that once certain obstacles were removed, disabled people would be able to do a lot more for themselves than society had imagined)" (Varela 1983: 36). In short, efforts to include those with disabilities became efforts to empower them as well. Moreover, the notion that environmental obstacles and not just the impairment of individuals were worthy of attention rendered it plausible to seek the enactment of laws and regulations that would do so. In other words, "environmental variables, unlike individual characteristics can be rectified through legislative and administrative action" (DeJong 1983: 25). In 1968, the Architectural Barriers Act was passed. It stipulated that any facility built with or merely receiving federal funds had to be accessible to all. However, enforcement was minimal (Varela 1983: 36). Fortunately, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, in a provision welcomed by the disability right movement, established the Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board (A&TBCB) to investigate and enforce compliance with established standards. Unfortunately, it "never received the funding it needed to enforce the law or even to investigate all . . . violations . . . reported by disabled consumers" (Varela 1983: 37). Nevertheless, the fight for accessibility did advance the cause of the disability rights movement. It helped make it clear that barriers included "social, political and intellectual obstacles, as well as physical ones" (Varela 1983: 37). Moreover, the 1973 Rehabilitation Act contained provisions in addition to the establishment of the A&TBCB which were important to the movement (Varela 1983: 40-41). It required the establishment, by state rehabilitation agencies, of selection methods that would ensure that people with severe impairments were not excluded from the agency's programs. In effect, then, the Act made it clear that no impairment, no matter how severe, was to be allowed as a consequences of a state agency's denial of services to become a disability. In addition, the 1973 act included provisions for client rights and for civil rights. Specifically, Section 504 prohibited discrimination against persons with so-called disabilities by any federally supported program. Thus, Section 504 was important to persons with so- called disabilities "who were looking for jobs . . . who wanted to use the same clinic as everyone else, who wanted the same choice of apartments, and who wanted to get into the polling places on election day" (Varela 1983: 42), who wanted simply to be an autonomous, contributing member of society. The next step in the history of legislation to empower and include people with impairments was the passage of Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA, originally called the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, P. L. 94-142). IDEA set "forth a comprehensive scheme" to ensure "two basic substantive rights of eligible children with disabilities . . . ." These were: "(1) the right to a free appropriate public education, and (2) the right to that education in the least restrictive environment" (National Council on Disability 2000: 28). The law applied in every state that receives federal funds under IDEA and to all public agencies authorized to provide special education and related services in a state that receives such funds. The Act was amended and reauthorized in 1997 (NCD 2000 30-31). In 1978, the Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services and Developmental Disabilities Amendments (P. L. 95-602) of the 1973 Rehabilitation Act were passed. The amendments evinced Congress' endorsement of the autonomy premise of the social model described above. That is, the Amendments acknowledged that persons with disabilities should be involved in forming the policies and practices which affect their lives. Specifically, it mandated that a grant for an independent living center "provide assurances that handicapped individuals be substantially involved in [the] policy direction and management of such center, and will be employed by such center" (P. L.. 95-602 as quoted by Varela 1983: 46). Many, if not most, however, view the enactment of the Americans with Disability Act (ADA) in 1990 as the crowning achievement of the disability rights movement. That act (P. L. 101-336) extended provisions of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the 1978 amendments well beyond the earlier application to federally supported programs and the state rehabilitation agencies and of the IDEA to special education. Indeed, it "codified into law important principles that would henceforth govern the relationship between [American] society and its citizens with disabilities . . . [and] altered public discourse about disability and about the role of people with disabilities in American society" (National Council on Disability 1997b: 4-5). It did so, first, by, in effect, making the marginalization, the exclusion of people with impairments from the mainstream of society in the United States, illegitimate. Specifically, it declared that "people with disabilities are an integral part of society and, as such, should not be segregated, isolated, or subjected to the effects of discrimination" (National Council on Disability 1997b: 4). Furthermore, it sought to enable "people with disabilities to take charge of their lives . . . by fostering employment opportunities, facilitating access to public transportation and public accommodation, and ensuring the use of our nation's communication system" (National Council on Disability 1997b: 4). Moreover, the principles of the ADA can serve as a basis to test and challenge public policies and practices not consistent with those principles and even to demand they be changed. The ADA, then, "upholds the principle that each individual has the potential, and deserves, the right to participate in, and contribute to, society" (National Council on Disability 1997b: 5).

#### we must posit ourselves as the government – that’s key to democracy

Rawls, Political Philosopher, ‘99 (John, The Law of Peoples, p. 56-7)

How is the ideal of public reason realized by citizens who are not government officials? In a representative government, citizens vote for representatives—chief executives, legislators, and the like—not for particular laws (except at a state or local level where they may vote di­rectly on referenda questions, which are not usually fundamental questions). To answer this question, we say that, ideally, citizens are to think of themselves as if they were legislators and ask themselves what statutes, supported by what reasons satisfying the criterion of reciprocity, they would think it most reasonable to enact. When firm and widespread, the disposition of citizens to view themselves as ideal legislators, and to repudiate government officials and candidates for public office who violate public reason, forms part of the political and social basis of liberal democracy and is vital for its enduring strength and vigor. Thus in domestic society citizens fulfill their duty of civility and support the idea of public reason, while doing what they can to hold government officials to it. This duty, like other political rights and duties, is an intrinsically moral duty. I emphasize that it is not a legal duty, for in that case it would be incompatible with freedom of speech. Similarly, the ideal of the public reason of free and equal peoples is realized, or satisfied, whenever chief executives and legislators, and other government officials, as well as candidates for public office, act from and follow the principles of the Law of Peoples and explain to other peoples their reasons for pursuing or revising a people’s foreign policy and affairs of state that involve other societies. As for private citizens, we say, as before, that ideally citizens are to think of themselves as if they were executives and legislators and ask themselves what foreign policy supported by what considerations they would think it most reasonable to advance. Once again, when firm and widespread, the disposition of citizens to view themselves as ideal executives and legislators, and to repudiate government officials and candidates for public office who violate the public reason of free and equal peoples, is part of the political and social basis of peace and understanding among peoples.

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#### It’s not just that the aff doesn’t solve but that it is actively harmful by inviting political inaction. A turn towards the personal is a turn away from the structural dimensions of social problems

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(Mari, “Taking Conversation, Dialogue, and Therapy Public ,” Rhetoric & Public Affairs 8.3 (2005) 405-430)

Fourth, a communicative model that views public issues through a relational, personal, or therapeutic lens nourishes hegemony by inviting political inaction. Whereas the objective of conventional public argument is achieving an instrumental goal such as a verdict or legislation, the aim of social conversation generally stops with self-expression. As Schudson puts it, "Conversation has no end outside itself."39 Similarly, modeling therapeutic paradigms that trumpet "talking cures" can discourage a search for political solutions to public problems by casting cathartic talk as sufficient remedy. As Campbell's analysis of consciousness-raising groups in the women's liberation movement points out, "[S]olutions must be structural, not merely personal, and analysis must move beyond personal experience and feeling . . . Unless such transcendence occurs, there is no persuasive campaign . . . [but] only the very limited realm of therapeutic, small group interaction."40 Finally, and related, a therapeutic framing of social problems threatens to locate the source and solution to such ills solely within the individual, the "self-help" on which much therapy rests. A postmodern therapeutic framing of conflicts as relational misunderstandings occasioned by a lack of dialogue not only assumes that familiarity inevitably breeds caring (rather than, say, irritation or contempt) but, more importantly, provides cover for ignoring the structural dimensions of social problems such as disproportionate black poverty. If objective reality is unavoidably a fiction, as Sheila McNamee claims, all suffering can be dismissed as psychological rather than based in real, material circumstance, enabling defenders of the status quo to admonish citizens to "heal" themselves.

#### The affirmatives emphasis on personal empowerment fortify’s hegemonic structures by containing dissent

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As the last century neared its close, the second-wave feminist slogan "The Personal Is Political" was turned on its head: the political became highly personalized. In this new politics of intimacy, candidates whistlestopped on Oprah Winfrey, political journalists posed as psychotherapists, and President "I feel your pain" Clinton presided in the popular imagination as The Great Empathizer and the Commander in Grief. Emblematic of this conflation of the private and the public was the increasing casting of social controversies such as affirmative action, escalating crime, and welfare reform in the language of "conversation," "dialogue," and the therapeutic talk of healing, dysfunction, coping, self-esteem, and empowerment. Among academics, this cult of conversation has been championed most ardently by communitarian political theorists, civic journalists, cultural feminists, postmodernists, multiculturalists, family therapists, and a number of communication scholars concerned with identity, the public sphere, conflict and negotiation, and counseling. In many cases, the rationale for a conversational [End Page 405] turn in the ways citizens conduct business, solve problems, and approach conflict is couched in a language interpolating "conversation" or "dialogue" with spirituality and therapy. Particularly visible is Deborah Tannen's 1998 bestseller The Argument Culture: Moving from Debate to Dialogue, wherein she blames a culture of critique for "corroding our spirit." Likewise, the earlier The Conversation of Journalism proposed supplanting the "disabling" monological approach to news reporting with a more inclusive dialogic paradigm overtly engaging citizens.3 So, too, at the University of New Hampshire in the late 1990s, administrators and some faculty proposed replacing the existing Academic Senate, which they termed "dysfunctional," with a nonvoting University Forum aimed to "advance functional conversation" and attendant community.4 And the conflation of the conversational and therapeutic for approaching public controversies is made explicit in the Boston Public Conversations Project, premised on "[t]he idea that family therapy skills can be fruitfully applied in the realm of 'public conversations'" on "divisive public issues" such as abortion.5 Perhaps the most conspicuous effort at replacing public debate with therapeutic dialogue was President Clinton's Conversation on Race, launched in mid-1997. Controversial from its inception for its ideological bent, the initiative met further widespread criticism for its encounter-group approaches to racial stratification and strife, critiques echoing previously articulated concerns—my own among them6 —that certain dangers lurk in employing private or social communication modes for public problem-solving Since then, others have joined in contesting the treating of public problems with narrative and psychological approaches, which—in the name of promoting civility, cooperation, personal empowerment, and socially constructed or idiosyncratic truths—actually work to contain dissent, locate systemic social problems solely within individual neurosis, and otherwise fortify hegemony.